In 2017, the main message at the Munich Satellite Summit was clear: GNSS needs a backup. Nearly 10 years later, the message hasn’t changed; we may have more tools available but very little progress has been made—while the threat to GNSS only continues to grow.
“How was the weather up there?” my friend asked.
I had just finished chairing the last session of the 2026 Munich Space Summit. The final question from the audience was in the nature of “why don’t we have a terrestrial system across most of the globe to back up GNSS and make the world safer?”
That triggered my “preacher mode.” I had mounted my soap box (hence the question about the weather up there) and given a version of my favorite sermon:
“Water and electricity are essential utilities. Today, PNT is also an essential utility, but it is invisible to almost everyone. This invisibility, especially among political leaders and other decision
makers, is a big obstacle to implementing complementary and backup systems for GNSS. Folks here at the summit are respected experts. You have a duty to share your knowledge and understanding with others, especially national governments. Go forth and tell the story.”
It was very much like the message I offered in 2017, but, nine years later, was a bit more urgent. While the West has seen some movement toward greater resilience since then, one wonders if it is commensurate with the increases in obvious threats and risks.
By the way, to answer my friend’s question—the weather on top of my soapbox usually seems clear. But there is always a chance of rant.
Munich 2017: Admitting a Solvable Problem
The 2026 event was my second time at the Munich summit. The first was in 2017. That year’s theme was “GNSS—Time for a Backup?”
Spoiler alert: The resounding answer from all was “yes!”
I was privileged to chair a distinguished panel asked to discuss the summit’s theme question. The “set up” in the program was:
The Challenge: GNSS has been described as “…a single point of failure for critical infrastructure.” Free and available anywhere with a view of the sky, GNSS timing and location signals have been incorporated into virtually every technology. GNSS service disruptions are caused by natural events, accidents and equipment malfunctions. Malicious acts by nation states, terrorists, organized crime, and “privacy seekers” are a widespread and increasing problem. Many nations are considering establishing terrestrial PNT systems to complement GNSS, or encouraging industry to establish such systems as a partly commercial enterprise. Members of the panel will be asked to describe desirable characteristics of such systems.
Definitions: For the purpose of this panel, “Backup” will be understood to mean one or more PNT systems to complement GNSS services. Complementary systems continuously operate alongside and seamlessly with GNSS and can be integrated in the same timing and navigation receivers.
While it was nine long years ago, the set up and panelists’ observations seem as on point today as they were then. Here is what the experts said nine years ago:
• Dominic Hayes (European Commission) discussed a project that at that point had collected the electronic signatures of over 100,000 jammers in Europe. He called for a comprehensive approach and said more than one complementary system would likely be needed if everyone was to be protected.
• Gian-Gherardo Calini (European GNSS Agency) agreed that more than one backup was needed and urged users to protect themselves.
• Francis Zachariae (IALA) asked who was responsible for protecting GNSS services. He opined that a big obstacle to progress was that we have not had a major failure event.
• Tony Flavin (Chronos) agreed the lack of a major failure had led to complacency. Also, using multiple GNSS did not provide much protection as most jammers hit all the systems simultaneously.
• Guy Buesnel (Spirent) discussed how spoofing was getting easier and cheaper, and that users need a warning when GNSS is not reliable. He also said spoofing and jamming were impacting aviation safety and operations.
• Professor Per Hoeg (Technical Institute of Denmark) cautioned that not all threat vectors were malicious. Solar activity can also profoundly impact GNSS signals.
• John Fischer (Orolia-Spectracom) discussed the importance of networks and the danger of over-dependence on space-based timing for synchronization.
• Harold “Stormy” Martin (U.S. National Coordination Office) said the U.S. President directed action on a GPS backup in 2004 and Congress had recently reinforced the need. His government was developing system requirements. It was long past time for a backup, he said.
Side discussions (often the most productive at such events) focused on technical mitigations and solutions. Galileo’s Public Regulated Service (PRS) service, ideas for low Earth Orbit (LEO) PNT, and terrestrial systems.
One attendee, Reelektronika’s Durk Van Willigen, even showed off an integrated GNSS/eLoran/Chayka receiver only 6 cm long. His company had developed it to meet what they saw as an emerging need.
The mood at and coming out of Munich 2017 was one of concern and expectation. The issues were clear and well understood. Yet, this was a solvable problem. Importantly, leadership in the European Union (EU) and U.S. were working on it.
Munich 2026: “How Do We Get There?”
Concerns expressed in 2017 were well represented and amplified at this year’s Munich Space Summit. Mentions of jamming, spoofing and other interference were ubiquitous and almost offhand. In 2026, disruption is no longer unusual. It is a normal part of the environment.
Yet, the agenda did not address the question of whether one or more complementary systems were needed to protect GNSS and users. It was an assumption in nearly every panel, every presentation, and every comment.
Panel topics included phrases like “resilient navigation, “multi-layer PNT” and “multi-faceted PNT.” Difficult times and the need for trust were regularly mentioned.
And, in a surprising parallel to 2017, an attendee at the event’s grand evening reception had his newest micro receiver with him to show around. Trevor Landon gave me a look at the new Iridium ASIC.
Recognition of the need for complements and alternatives to GNSS was universal. There was less agreement on which systems should be implemented.
But this was to be expected. Many, if not most, attendees have already decided on their favorite system. They’ve dedicated years of effort to developing and understanding their technology, have a substantial financial interest in its success, or both. And the systems discussed were overwhelmingly space-based or space-dependent. Which made perfect sense. It was the Munich Space Summit, after all.
Progress Since 2017
The last day, last panel, and last question of the summit was why, nine years later, we have not done more about complementing and backing up GNSS.
For the previous two and a half days, incredibly intelligent and capable people had affirmed the need and demonstrated that a wealth of solutions are available.
Private and government studies in the West have shown the value of combining signals from space, terrestrial broadcast, and fiber-based timing. This “resilient triad” can create a national PNT architecture that is very difficult to disrupt. Extant systems in China, Russia, South Korea, and elsewhere are exemplars of what’s possible.
Many rightly question why the West hasn’t made more of a start. In fairness, some projects are underway, and others are emerging.
The EU is exploring LEO PNT and launched the first two Celeste satellites the day after the summit closed. U.S. companies Xona Space Systems and TrustPoint have made their business cases and are in the early stages of building their constellations.
Scandinavia is building out a fiber timing network connecting Sweden, Finland and Norway. There are papers and proposals for the EU to do the same thing on the continent.
Baltic nations have extensively tested R-mode for maritime. The European Aviation Safety Agency has issued an action that suggests examining additional navigation sources, though such a study would be done in the distant future.
More proactively, the United Kingdom is the first Western nation that’s committed to establishing a coherent and integrated resilient PNT triad. A fiber timing network with three centers spread across Britian is being implemented. It will feed users directly and support a terrestrial broadcast eLoran network that will serve the entire nation and most of the North Sea. The UK government is also investing in LEO PNT.
While less public about its plans, France has recently joined the UK in its eLoran project. Depending on the scope of the French effort, the two systems could provide high-power terrestrial broadcast time to most of Western Europe. This signal at 100kHz would presumably complement France’s existing 162kHz time signal. Also, the Paris Observatory has been forward leaning on international time synchronization over fiber. It has established synchronizing optical fiber links with laboratories in the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany.
But Is It Enough?
One can rightly ask if enough has been done in enough places.
Has Europe progressed far enough and in enough ways to mitigate the risk of daily minor disruptions and the much greater risk of PNT denial in struggles between major powers?
And what of the inter-dependent world writ large?
Major economies in the United States, Japan, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, and Mexico seem to still be overwhelmingly dependent on highly vulnerable signals from space. For smaller economies, the idea of sovereign, resilient PNT to complement GNSS may not even be a “someday” vision.
Yet, there are very, very few among the world’s eight billion people who don’t depend on uninterrupted PNT service in their daily lives. For many, the possibility of a major GNSS disruption is an invisible sword of Damocles.
And let’s all remember, as those who understand the issues, our duty to speak up and share our knowledge and concern. Too often I hear that such issues are “above my paygrade.” If your boss doesn’t know the problem and isn’t concerned and involved, then this issue is exactly at your pay grade. You have a duty to speak out.
Let’s strive to ensure the next nine years see more progress instituting widely adopted resilient PNT than we saw in the last nine. We owe it to ourselves and the world we serve.
OK, now the weather atop the soap box seems like it is turning to rant. So, as they say in church, here endeth the sermon. Go in peace.
