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2017 and 2018 saw unprecedented GNSS interference activity, from the eastern Mediterranean to Norway and Finland. Syria emerged as a testbed for electronic warfare capabilities. In April 2018, General Raymond Thomas, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, referred to the region as “the most aggressive electronic warfare environment on the planet.”
For driverless vehicles, current GNSS meter-level positioning accuracy still serves for lane-level detection. However, hazardous misleading information poses a serious, disruptive and critical safety concern.
Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) play an essential role in automotive electronic control systems, providing measurements for tire pressure monitoring, vehicle stability control, adaptive suspension, rollover protection systems, and navigation systems. While MEMS gyros and accelerometers are suitable for vehicular applications in terms of size and cost, noise properties (large bias and signi cant 1/f noise) create problems, especially in low dynamic conditions or when measurements are integrated from angular rates to angles or from acceleration to velocity and position. GNSS receivers can complement these measurements but the availability and accuracy drops in urban canyons and underground.
The long-running fight between the GPS community and Ligado Networks intensified in the final months of 2019, fueled by a draft regulatory order, a flurry of letters and scrutiny of the sale of a high-profile supplier.
GNSS jamming and spoofing continue to draw keen audience interest at the hottest, coolest and even the most obscure tech, trade and public policy conferences. Speakers can now recount any number of realworld spoo ng incidents where GNSS users have been fooled by tech wunderkind, unwitting technology demonstrators and even enemy regimes.