Led by Latvia, 17 nations called upon the European Union (EU) to take action on GNSS interference originating in Russia and Belarus.
The letter described the GNSS interference as not random incidents but systematic, deliberate actions by Russia and Belarus. They were described as hybrid attacks designed to impact all manner of technology, especially transport.
The letter was considered at a meeting of the EU’s Transport, Telecommunication and Energy Council on June 5.
In response, the EU Council’s General Secretariat issued a “Call for common actions in response to Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing threats.”
The call included seven actions for transport ministers to take, including:
- “Evaluate and coordinate the possibility to suspend the right to Russia and Belarus in the ITU to register the use of radio resources while GNSS interference is in progress.” Thousands of cases of GNSS interference in member countries in the last 18 months were cited as proof that actions at ITU to date have been ineffective at reducing interference.
- “Reassess the current transport reliance on GNSS-based navigation and deploy alternative or complementary systems, including ground-based legacy solutions.” This may include acceleration of the EU’s efforts to develop a fiber-based timing system that could support terrestrial navigation solutions. Also, the UK is in the process of implementing an eLoran positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) system that will be exceptionally difficult to disrupt. In addition to providing PNT to the British Isles and their maritime approaches, usable timing signals from the system also will be available to much of Europe. The prevalence of GNSS interference may persuade many EU nations to partner with the UK and add their own differential or primary transmitters to enable more precise timing or full PNT.
- “According to the risks, mandate regular operational procedures training for pilots, air traffic controllers, air traffic safety electronics personnel on GNSS interference detection, response (including use of alternate navigation procedures) and mitigation.” Airlines and air traffic control organizations have already instituted such training. It may well be that this can be better coordinated and improved as there are significant differences in procedures between organizations.
- “Promote industry-manufacturer collaboration for mitigation tools and updates. Support operator-level reviews of backup system readiness, ensuring non-GNSS alternatives are usable and practiced.” This will be easier, and to a certain extent is already on-going, for aviation. Other modes of transport such as maritime and surface transport, which at the moment are less impacted, will likely find this more difficult.
- “Draw the attention of critical infrastructure operators and unmanned system manufacturers to the risks that may arise from interference with GNSS.” Improved awareness is always beneficial to help enable citizens and organizations to protect themselves. Yet, the lack of easily accessed alternatives will make action difficult.
- “Develop action plans for different domains (space, aviation, maritime, telecommunications) to avoid potential duplication of efforts and coordinate short-term and long-term measures at EU and national level.”
- “Continue cooperation with all relevant stakeholders (ITU, ICAO, IMO, EASA, EMSA, IATA, EUROCONTROL).”
Many of these actions can be easily implemented by national transport ministers and authorities.
Some, though, require more unified action across the 27 sovereign nations of the European Union. These are clearly more difficult than would be the case for a more empowered central authority.
As cross-cutting issues like this continue to arise, it will be interesting to see if agencies or the European Council itself receive greater issue or domain specific authorities.
