For decades, timing has been the least visible element of positioning, navigation and timing. Positioning and navigation tend to draw the operational attention. Timing sits deeper in the architecture, synchronizing networks, aligning systems and enabling the data flows modern missions require. But in contested environments, where GNSS signals can be jammed, spoofed or lost, timing is no longer a background utility. It becomes a measure of resilience.

That is the market Oscilloquartz is addressing. The company has more than 75 years of timing heritage and a long record in telecom synchronization, but its current strategy is aimed at a defense market that is beginning to treat trusted time as a core requirement for resilient PNT.

Gil Biran, who leads Oscilloquartz, describes the company’s position directly. “We are the timing enabler for any PNT mission-critical defense network,” he said. That statement reflects both technical confidence and strategic ambition. Oscilloquartz wants to be understood not simply as a supplier of clocks, but as a provider of timing architectures for defense users operating in degraded and contested environments, including mobile deployments.”

The shift builds on the company’s experience in mobile networks. When Biran took over the business after its acquisition from the Swatch Group, Oscilloquartz had lost ground in what had become one of the most demanding timing markets. The company refocused on systems rather than components and built an NTP and PTP portfolio around the synchronization needs of mobile operators. Oscilloquartz, Biran said, moved from roughly 20% share in mobile operators globally to about 80%.

That experience matters because telecom forced the company to solve timing as a network problem with accuracy that was measured in nanoseconds. Mobile operators needed synchronization at scale, across large distributed networks, with high availability, resiliency and standards-based performance. Defense users need many of the same fundamentals, but under more severe conditions.

FROM TELECOM SYNCHRONIZATION TO DEFENSE TIMING

“The foundational requirements for PNT are the same across mission-critical networks, whether it’s a mobile operator, power utility or defense organization,” Biran said. “Now, we have to focus on the differences.”

Those differences are significant. In telecom, timing equipment is generally installed in fixed sites. In defense, timing has to operate across ground, airborne, maritime and mobile applications. Systems may be mounted in vehicles, deployed in command centers, integrated into shelters, placed on platforms or connected to legacy infrastructure.

Biran identifies two immediate translation points from telecom to defense: physical interfaces and ruggedization. Defense networks retain large amounts of legacy infrastructure, and timing systems must connect to what is already fielded. “Defense is all about legacy,” he said. “It’s all about equipment that is sitting there for tens of years, and nobody’s going to touch.” To participate in those architectures, Oscilloquartz has had to support specialized physical interfaces that are uncommon in commercial telecom networks.

The second requirement is ruggedization. “In the telecom space everything is on the ground, everything is in a fixed location,” Biran said. “When you move to defense, you have ground applications, you have airborne applications, you have maritime applications, and now in most of these applications you are on the move.” That reality is behind the launch of the ruggedSync™ Series OSA 5510, which Biran describes as a rugged clock unit designed to bring Oscilloquartz’s timing capabilities into defense environments without rebuilding the entire product concept.

The deeper defense requirement is not only rugged hardware. It is trust.

For years, many timing architectures treated GNSS as the primary source and internal oscillators or network references as backups. Biran argues that this model no longer fits the threat environment. “The primary is GNSS,” he said. “Why set the least reliable source as the primary? That was good for the old days, not today.”

ZERO-TRUST TIMING IN A GNSS-DENIED WORLD

That observation leads directly to Oscilloquartz’s view of zero-trust timing. In practical terms, zero trust means no single timing source is accepted without evaluation. A defense node should be able to compare multiple timing inputs, assign different levels of confidence to each source depending on its reliability, detect anomalies and continue distributing trusted time. The issue is not whether GNSS remains useful. It does. The issue is whether the architecture depends on GNSS as an unquestioned authority.

“Every node in the network should have as many as possible sources, and the focus should be on diversified sources,” Biran said. In that model, GNSS may be one input, but it is not the only one. Other sources may include LEO-based timing, terrestrial RF sources, NIST references, PTP, White Rabbit and local atomic clocks. Biran compares the architecture to a recipe in which different sources receive different weights according to their reliability. Cesium, because it does not depend on an external signal, carries a different weight than a satellite signal that can be denied or manipulated.

This is where Oscilloquartz sees cesium and optical pumping as central to defense timing resilience. Holdover is often discussed as a clock specification, but in defense it is better understood as the last line of defense. If a system can maintain trusted time after GNSS is lost, it can continue operating. If it cannot, the network and the mission begin to degrade.

Biran points to submarines as a clear example. “Why do submarines need the cesium clock? Because if you’re underwater for two months, you will not know where you are unless you have a reliable, accurate clock source,” he said. The same principle extends beyond the undersea domain. As defense systems become more mobile and as GNSS denial becomes more common, the ability to maintain time without external reference becomes a strategic capability.

Oscilloquartz has invested in optical pumping technology for cesium clocks for much more than a decade, work Biran links to both performance and size. He said the company can hold 100 nanoseconds for up to 150 days, a figure he contrasts with rubidium-class holdover at far shorter durations. “Even if GNSS will disappear for six months, we can still maintain the mission critical network with this level of accuracy,” he said. He also makes clear that this is not only about duration. Airborne and mobile systems impose constraints on size, weight and stability under vibration. “You have lasers inside the box,” Biran said. “How do you make sure that the laser is stable enough when the unit is moving, is under vibration? This is not a simple challenge.”

The larger point is that defense organizations should not think about timing as a collection of individual devices. They need to think about time as a distributed system-level resource. A high-stability core clock is important, but it is not enough. Trusted time has to move across networks, reach edge nodes, be monitored, compared, managed and protected.

“Our solution is not just a box,” Biran said. “It’s a networking solution.” He points to White Rabbit technology as one path for distributing high-accuracy timing over fiber, and to management systems that allow operators to see and control timing across the network. In a contested environment, that visibility matters. Operators need to know which sources are available, which nodes are degraded, where timing quality is changing and when the system has shifted into holdover.

ASSURED TIME AS A NETWORK ARCHITECTURE

The company is also watching a broader shift toward distributed timescale solutions. Historically, national timing could be delivered from a small number of sites. That model becomes harder as users need tighter timing closer to the mission. “You need to bring the time scale source close to the customer,” Biran said. He sees defense organizations moving toward more localized time sources, including service-level or agency-level timescales that can support operational networks without depending entirely on distant infrastructure.

For Oscilloquartz, the technical strategy is now being matched by a go-to-market shift. Biran is direct about the distinction: selling into defense is not the same as selling into telecom. The company has added sales talent with defense-sector experience, expanded its U.S. channel through representation firms focused on defense markets, and is building out value-added reseller relationships with defense expertise in EMEA and APAC. The customer path is different as well.

“We are not selling the full defense solution,” Biran said. “We are providing the timing that enables these vendors and system integrators to provide a full end-to-end defense solution.”

That distinction is important for the U.S. DoD market. Timing is rarely purchased in isolation. It is specified into systems, integrated into platforms and evaluated as part of larger mission 
architectures. Oscilloquartz’s near-term task is therefore as much educational as commercial. It must show defense users that the “T” in PNT is not a supporting detail. It is a foundation for network resilience, autonomy and operational continuity.

How will Oscilloquartz know it has succeeded? Biran points to revenue mix, defense leads, pipeline growth and program wins. The company, he said, has already won major defense projects, including in the United States, though he does not name them, due to the confidential nature of the business. The broader milestone will be market recognition: when Oscilloquartz is seen not only as a telecom synchronization company, but as a global defense timing provider.

For defense users, the underlying issue is clear. GNSS will remain essential, but it cannot be the only trusted source of time. The next phase of PNT will depend on architectures that can evaluate, preserve and distribute time even when the external environment is compromised. Oscilloquartz is betting that its telecom-scale experience, rugged timing portfolio, cesium technology and zero-trust approach position it for that shift.

In Biran’s words, “The baseline is to have the right solution.” In defense timing, that baseline is moving quickly from accurate clocks to assured and resilient time.

The post The “T” in Contested PNT appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

Electronic warfare is reshaping the PNT problem on today’s battlefield. Jamming, spoofing, meaconing and sustained RF pressure are now part of the operational reality that warfighters must plan for and operate through. The war in Ukraine has made that reality highly visible, with each new reported incident reinforcing the same point: the threat is no longer episodic or theoretical. It is an operational condition that is likely to persist and expand.

That reality has senior officials across the Department of War (DoW) urgently looking for practical solutions, with growing emphasis on getting advanced, modernized military GPS capabilities such as M-Code more widely fielded. The objective is not to abandon GPS. It is to strengthen it.

MODERN MILITARY GPS VS. LEGACY SYSTEMS 

Even in this new landscape, military GPS remains the most mature and protected source of precision, absolute PNT available to authorized users, said Luke Bishop, Product Line Director at BAE Systems. The right response is not to replace GPS, but to field modern military GPS, protect it, toughen it and augment it with additional sensors that can fill specific mission gaps.

“People are worried that GPS doesn’t work anymore and that we have to find an alternative,” BAE Ground Products Portfolio Director Zack Hamilton said. “The GPS capabilities they’ve enjoyed for the last 40 years is still what they want—absolute, precise PNT—they just want it to work all the time, even inside a threat environment.”

The lesson is not that GPS has lost its relevance. The lesson is that assured PNT must start with the most protected form of GPS available to the warfighter, then build outward through anti-jam, anti-spoof, integrity monitoring and mission-specific complementary sensors.

Some describe the current challenge as a GPS-denied problem, but that characterization can be too broad and too simplistic. “GPS denied” is not a requirement; it is a condition that must be defined. What kind of jamming? What level of spoofing? What platform? What altitude? What mission duration? What SWaP-C limit? What level of integrity is required? Without that specificity, platforms risk treating very different PNT problems as though they are the same.

It is also important to remember that GPS user equipment is not created equal. Many publicly discussed examples of GPS failure in contested environments involve unaided commercial GPS, legacy systems or insufficiently hardened architectures—not modern military GPS protected by M-Code, anti-jam/anti-spoof capability and complementary sensors. Many civil solutions used in contested environments do not provide the same level of protection, authentication or threat-informed hardening as modern military GPS.

The same distinction applies inside the military GPS community. Legacy Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) equipment is not the same as modern M-Code systems with advanced anti-jam and anti-spoof protection and increased cyber resilience.

“It’s important to understand a lot of the platforms and systems out there today have yet to be upgraded to M-Code or the most cutting-edge anti-jam technology,” Bishop said. “People see some of these performance challenges out in the field and they draw incorrect conclusions and therefore assume these challenges apply to all user equipment configurations.”

For years, BAE Systems has built hardened military GPS solutions with M-Code as the primary PNT source, supplementing that core capability with what Bishop described as “world class anti-jam and anti-spoof.” Though adoption remains a challenge, M-Code solutions and complementary APNT architectures are available today. The issue is not whether the capability exists. It is how quickly the defense community can move through integration, certification and fielding pathways to get that capability into warfighters’ hands.

M-Code is ready. This is a fielding problem.

“By maximizing the protection of M-Code, system designers can focus on lower cost sensors for the complementary parts of PNT,” Bishop said. “So, it brings the overall system cost down and gives system designers the ability to tailor solutions to the needs of each mission and platform.”

MILITARY GPS REMAINS THE APNT FOUNDATION

Military GPS remains indispensable because it provides precise absolute position (World Geodetic Survey 1984 (WGS84), precise time (Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), global availability and decades of threat-informed hardening. It is also a capability that many current military personnel have relied on throughout their entire careers. To operate successfully in the contested environments warfighters now face, DoW must more widely field systems equipped to handle the modernized M-Code signal, then toughen that military GPS layer with anti-jam/anti-spoof and augment it with other sensors in layered, mission-specific APNT architectures.

There are few sensors that provide absolute position, said Matt Bousselot, a technical fellow in PNT at BAE Systems, and absolute time is even more difficult. That makes military GPS especially compelling. APNT is not a choice between “GPS” and “alternatives.” Military GPS provides the trusted core; complementary sensors fill specific mission gaps.

There is also no signal, Bousselot said, that has been as thoroughly toughened, protected and hardened as military GPS.

“We’ve had multiple decades of dealing in the threat mitigation business,” Bousselot said, “so we have countermeasures to those threats, and countermeasures to the countermeasures that have been built into the user equipment for the last 20, 30 years.”

When new signals come online, he said, it is not just the signal in space that matters. It is also the user equipment development that has happened around that signal to counter evolving threats. Military GPS has benefited from decades of operational feedback, technical iteration and threat-specific mitigation. That is difficult for newer signals or sensor approaches to replicate quickly.

That distinction is central to the current APNT debate. Modern military GPS is not static. It continues to evolve as users encounter new threat conditions and feed those lessons back into the system. Contested GPS performance is not a reason to move away from GPS. It is a reason to continue improving and fielding the most protected GPS user equipment available.

“Right now,” Bousselot said, “GPS is easily the primary in any PNT PACE plan.”

LAYERED APNT, NOT SINGLE-SENSOR REPLACEMENT

There is no magic bullet, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution. The EW threat will not be solved with one untoughened sensor, one alternative technology or one universal replacement for GPS.

Inertial sensors, clocks, RF alternatives, vision navigation and emerging technologies all play important roles. Each can add value in the right context. But each also has weaknesses and limitations. When it comes to providing absolute precision time and position, Hamilton said, “GPS is easily the toughest thing going.”

To achieve APNT resilience, the solution must be a mission-driven architecture built around complementary, not alternative, PNT. Military GPS remains the foundation. Other sensors are selected and integrated based on the mission, the threat environment, the platform and the level of trust required. GPS and other sensors degrade for different reasons, which is precisely why they must be combined intelligently.

“It’s not about GPS versus something else,” Bishop said. “It’s about the right blend. And if I can toughen GPS sufficiently, I can save money on these other sensors that go with it. It may not be wise to invest huge dollars into a vis nav-only solution that has its own weaknesses. The focus should be on creating an APNT system that gets me the best cost per successful mission.”

That idea—cost per successful mission—is important because the real measure of an APNT architecture is not the unit cost of any individual sensor. It is whether the complete system can complete the mission in the threat environment it is expected to face.

An inexpensive system that fails in the intended environment is not a low-cost solution. Likewise, an exquisite sensor that exceeds the mission need may drive unnecessary cost and complexity. The APNT challenge is to match the solution to the mission, the threat and the platform.

Mission success is what matters. It does not help to deploy an inexpensive system that is ineffective in the environment where it is expected to operate, Bishop said. Solutions must be tailored to the mission and the EW environment.

By strengthening the core GPS layer, M-Code can reduce the burden placed on other sensors and help control total system cost. It can also allow designers to use complementary sensors more selectively and more intelligently, rather than trying to force any one sensor to solve the entire navigation problem.

For example, upgrading to a modernized GPS receiver and anti-jam antenna in an APNT system substantially reduces the area of impact for electronic threats to GPS. This reduces the amount of time the system must rely on alternate, contingency and emergency methods of navigation, and enables the use of much lower cost alternate sensors to achieve mission success. The cost reduction of alternate sensors often more than offsets the cost of the upgrade.

So, the question is not which sensor replaces GPS. The question is which architecture gives the mission the highest confidence of success.

INTEGRITY: VERIFY, DO NOT JUST FUSE

Adding sensors is not enough. The APNT system must know which inputs are trustworthy, when they are degrading and how much confidence should be assigned to them. That is especially critical in contested environments, where a sensor can continue producing data even when that data is compromised, degraded or misleading.

The central issue is not simply availability. It is trust.

In an effort to improve availability, many systems look to additional signals and sensors. But redundancy does not automatically create integrity. Additional sensors improve the solution only if the system understands when and how to trust them.

“What we worry about when we start pulling other signals into our solution is how can we trust them,” Bousselot said. “It’s actually possible to bring other signals into an M-Code based solution that make the entire system less effective for the mission because those signals were added in a way that isn’t trustworthy.”

Additional signals must either be protected to the level the military GPS signal is protected, Bousselot said, or their limitations must be understood so they can be incorporated “in a smart way.”

Integrity is a top priority for customers. In many cases, users would rather have no solution than a solution they cannot trust. That is why sensor credibility must be verified, not simply fused into the navigation solution.

With its Integrity Ring concept, BAE Systems does not simply fuse data from multiple sensors. Each sensor’s input is actively evaluated before being included in the final PNT solution. If a sensor begins to diverge from the consensus or behave inconsistently with the expected mission environment, it can be excluded or weighted differently. Mike Shepherd, Director of APNT Strategy at BAE’s Navigation and Sensor System’s Business, has likened the concept to a courtroom: each sensor provides testimony, and the integrity function serves as the judge.

This allows for multi-sensor PNT integrity, which means available signals and sensors can be used while maintaining high trust in the final PNT solution.

But customers cannot afford to put the most premium solution on every platform, Bousselot said, so integrity also must scale. As with anti-jam performance, there is always a trade-off around integrity, SWaP-C and mission need. A baseline level of integrity comes with modern military GPS user equipment, but higher levels of integrity and anti-spoofing capability can require additional processing, hardware or system complexity.

That means customers must make choices around cost versus performance even as it relates to integrity.

“Some of the interactions we’ve had with customers and potential partners recently have been, how do we relay the information to them as to what level of integrity they’re getting so they can make good decisions on that data,” Bousselot said, “versus just trying to get them the best integrity that exists, which may not be able to fit on their platform.”

That nuance matters. Not every platform needs or can afford the most exquisite APNT suite. But every platform needs an architecture appropriate to its mission, threat environment and trust requirements. Integrity must be engineered into that architecture from the start.

M-CODE FIELDING URGENCY

Relying on legacy systems or insufficiently protected PNT architectures increases risk for warfighters operating in contested environments. The message is direct: M-Code is ready. This is a fielding problem.

The issue is not whether modernized military GPS capability exists. The issue is how quickly program offices, integrators and platform owners can move through integration, qualification, adoption and fielding pathways.

M-Code adds important protections, but adoption has lagged threat environment demands. There has been movement, however. Senior DoW leaders increasingly recognize the urgency of fielding M-Code and reducing reliance on waivers or legacy approaches that leave platforms without the most modern military GPS capability available.

To push M-Code adoption forward, program offices must distinguish between availability, obsolescence and fielding timelines. One issue the market raises involves concern about supply availability and whether programs should wait for later technology increments. Fieldable M-Code solutions are available now, and waiting can become its own source of operational risk.

M-Code is available across domains. BAE Systems is already shipping M-Code solutions for ground, weapons and airborne applications. This is not primarily an availability or production-capacity issue. It is a matter of accelerating platform integration, adoption and fielding.

There is also a perception challenge. Recent GAO reporting on GPS modernization, for example, has focused on the progress of M-Code capable user equipment in Programs of Record (POR), Bishop said. That is an important piece of the puzzle, but it is not the whole picture. Industry has also moved forward with commercial M-Code solutions that are available today and ready for authorized users outside of PORs.

A casual reader of modernization reporting could come away with the impression that the M-Code universe is limited to a small number of formal program-of-record products, Bishop said, when the actual set of industry-developed capabilities is broader.

“Don’t just focus on the Programs of Record,” Bishop said. “When you think about M-Code, focus on what the industry has come forward with as a whole.”

This is where the current moment becomes urgent. The threat environment has changed. The operational need is visible. The technology is ready. The industrial base exists. The next challenge is fielding.

LESSONS FROM WEAPONS—AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UAS

Precision weapons have long had to operate in severe threat environments under extreme SWaP-C constraints. As a result, the weapons community has already matured around architectures that protect military GPS, toughen it with anti-jam and anti-spoof capability, and augment it with inertial sensing to achieve precise absolute PNT.

That history matters because weapons have been forced to solve the problem many other platforms are now confronting. They have had to operate in contested environments, under severe size, weight, power and cost pressure, while still delivering the mission outcome.

Weapons, Shepherd said, show the value of M-Code-centered APNT in some of the hardest operating environments. The weapons community understands M-Code as a core capability for reaching targets with high accuracy, and it has leaned heavily into military GPS protection, anti-jam/anti-spoof toughening and inertial augmentation.

The lessons learned are increasingly relevant to small UAS and launched effects, which face many similar constraints: contested environments, high-volume production, rapid design cycles, mission consequences and severe SWaP-C pressure.

Small UAS and launched effects may have more to learn from the weapons community than from traditional aviation modernization models. Manned aviation follows a different and often slower modernization path because of long aircraft life cycles, certification requirements, safety considerations, block upgrade structures and the cost of modifying large installed fleets.

“They’re likely not going to ground an airplane and send it back to the depot just for an M-Code upgrade,” Bishop said. “It will be part of block upgrades. So, there’s that reality of how the aircraft lifecycle works, versus I’m going to build a new munition instead of retrofitting an existing one. It’s just a very different model on how the fielding occurs.”

When aircraft updates are made, there is often a focus on provisioning as much as possible for future agility, Bishop said. That can work against SWaP-C goals and add complexity to the problem, making airborne modernization different from weapons or smaller UAS markets.

There is also a class of aircraft, he said, that must address additional safety-of-life requirements, adding more complexity and feeding into the broader system safety architecture. The cost and complexity of safety certification can slow adoption, and can encourage programs to bundle many requirements into larger modernization efforts rather than fielding a single capability quickly.

Small UAS and launched effects are different. Their design cycles are shorter. Their SWaP-C constraints are more severe. Their production tempo is faster. Their architectures can evolve more rapidly. In many ways, they resemble the weapons market more than the manned aircraft market.

That creates both a risk and an opportunity. If UAS developers treat GPS as a fragile commercial input or assume that alternative sensors can replace a protected military GPS core, they may under-equip their systems for the threat environments they will face. If they learn from the weapons community, however, they can build around M-Code protection, anti-jam/anti-spoof toughening, integrity and mission-specific augmentation from the start.

“This is still an emerging, young market and I feel like they could learn a lot of lessons from the weapons space,” Hamilton said. “Drone manufacturers are under equipping their PNT systems right now and we believe, over time, they will mature and adopt a lot of similar technologies to include M-Code with proper AJ and the right kind of augmentation.”

The point is not to dismiss other sensors or emerging approaches. Vision navigation, inertial sensing, timing technologies and other complementary capabilities all have a role. The point is that those technologies should be integrated into a trusted APNT architecture, not treated as universal replacements for GPS.

Integrating M-Code into small UAS and launched effects early in the design cycle can help manufacturers bring more mission-capable systems to the warfighter. Because those design cycles more closely resemble munitions than manned aircraft, and because they share similar SWaP-C constraints that the weapons community has already confronted, the opportunity to apply those lessons is immediate.

SCALE, INSERTION AND INDUSTRIAL READINESS

M-Code GPS-based APNT is no longer only a future concept problem. It is a fielding and architecture discipline problem that can be acted on today. BAE Systems is positioned to scale to meet demand without requiring significant new capital investment. As Bishop put it, “We’re ready to go.”

That readiness is partly the result of BAE Systems’ broad customer footprint, Bishop said, and the market cycles the company is already set up to support. BAE Systems also describes its military GPS business as operating with a commercial-style investment model, giving the company flexibility to move quickly, invest ahead of demand and support customer needs on relevant timelines.

“It’s very much a commercial business where we invest, we take the risk,” he said. “That incentivizes us to drive efficiencies and compete more on commercial terms.”

In many traditional government contracting models, vendors wait until after receiving a contract to invest in materials from the supply chain. BAE Systems often leans forward, buying materials well in advance of the contract award. That approach gives the company a level of agility more commonly associated with commercial markets—an approach that aligns with DoW’s increasing interest in speed, scalability and fieldable capability.

That is the way BAE Systems Navigation & Sensor Systems product line has operated for years, Bishop said, giving the company the ability to “surge and get these products done on a relevant timeline.” The Cedar Rapids facility represents a mature military GPS production base, and that production foundation positions the company to support fielding at scale.

“We’ve been asked in every senior leader meeting, if we surge, if we come to you and say we’re going to buy two to three times above what we normally do, is there any investment we need to provide to you to expand your facility,” Shepherd said. “There’s no investment. We can scale. We’re set up to do that.”

The same fielding logic applies to integration. Backward-compatible and lower-burden insertion paths are central to accelerating adoption, and BAE Systems has made that a key focus. The goal is to reduce integration pain wherever possible, especially for platforms that need modernized military GPS capability quickly.

“You’re going to disconnect, pull the old one out, put the new one in,” Shepherd said. “The same cable, the same antenna. We think about that pain, and then we try to take it away.”

That does not mean every integration challenge disappears. Certification, platform-specific requirements and program timing still matter. But modernization does not always have to be treated as a distant, bespoke, high-friction upgrade. In many cases, practical insertion paths exist today.

KEEPING UP WITH THE THREAT

Slogans, single sensors and delayed modernization will not solve the APNT challenge. Nor will treating GPS and resilience as opposing ideas. PNT starts by fielding the most protected military GPS layer available (M-Code), then building around it with anti-jam, anti-spoof, integrity monitoring and mission-specific complementary sensors.

Replacing GPS with so-called alternative solutions is not the answer. The stronger approach is to field hardened military GPS and incorporate the right complementary sensors to fill the remaining gaps.

“When you start trying to do worldwide precision absolute navigation and timing with anything besides GPS, the job gets really, really hard,” Hamilton said. “What GPS brings to the table in our APNT model is it reduces their problem set to a small space where, in the worst conditions, GPS, or maybe toughened GPS, needs some help, but now they have to solve a half a mile or a mile or a five mile problem, not a 25,000 mile problem.”

That idea captures the practical value of military GPS-centered APNT. GPS does not have to solve every problem alone. But when protected and integrated properly, it reduces the size of the problem other sensors must solve. It gives the architecture a trusted foundation. It narrows the gaps. It helps bound error. It gives complementary sensors a more realistic role.

Layered architectures are understood. Integrity principles are mature. One APNT architecture, with M-Code at its core, can scale across domains, with the sensor mix varying by mission and platform. The technology is there and ready to be leveraged.

M-Code is ready. This is a fielding problem.

The task now is to field modern military GPS-based APNT at the speed and scale the threat environment demands. And like Bishop said, BAE Systems is ready for it. 

The post Military GPS at the Core appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

In many small-UAS architectures, positioning, heading, inertial sensing, corrections, estimation, and control are still distributed across separate modules with different assumptions, update rates, and confidence models. That approach can work in nominal conditions, but it also creates more places for latency, inconsistency, and error propagation to enter the stack.

Hyfix is positioning the H1 as an architectural response to that problem. The company’s core argument is that too much uncertainty is still being passed across subsystem boundaries, making autonomous behavior harder to model and trust. Its answer is what can be described as stack compression: bringing positioning, timing, estimation, compute, and communications into a single co-designed architecture so the system error model can be treated more coherently. The claim is not simply that more functions reside on one device, but that tighter integration can constrain error earlier, improve confidence modeling, and reduce the disconnect between navigation and control.

WHY STACK COMPRESSION MATTERS

In a conventional architecture, each subsystem is optimized largely for itself. The GNSS receiver solves for position and time. The flight controller solves for attitude and control. The IMU supplies motion data to the flight stack. A companion computer handles heavier autonomy logic. Corrections arrive as an external service. Radios handle their own timing and links. Integration is required at every layer, and much of that integration is repeated from one platform program to the next.

The result is not just complexity. It is an error-modeling challenge. If a system begins to behave badly, the root cause can sit anywhere: a timing mismatch between modules, an IMU limitation inside the autopilot stack, a corrupted GNSS solution presented with misleading confidence, or a mismatch between what one module thinks “good data” means and what another assumes it means. From an engineering standpoint, each interface creates another place where error can be delayed, transformed, or misinterpreted. That is why Hyfix emphasizes that the challenge in autonomy is not simply getting a better measurement. It is understanding where error comes from, keeping it inside known bounds, and preventing it from cascading into bad decisions or unstable control.

This is the real significance of stack compression. The H1 is intended to bring those functions inside one architecture so timing, corrections, estimation, and control operate on a shared state rather than across loosely coupled interfaces. In that model, data stays on-chip instead of moving across boards, reducing delay and limiting opportunities for timing drift or interpretation error.

TIGHT COUPLING AND THE ESTIMATOR PROBLEM

Hyfix says every H1 runs the NuttX operating system and is loaded with the PX4 stack natively. That is significant because it changes where the integration occurs. Traditional flight controllers such as PX4 and ArduPilot are strong on attitude estimation, but their GPS-denied inertial navigation performance is often limited by the IMUs typically integrated on standard boards. More advanced fusion frequently gets pushed to the integrator, who must add a companion computer such as a Raspberry Pi or Nvidia Jetson. GNSS modules may also include embedded fusion, but those algorithms are often built around 2-D or low-dynamic ground-vehicle assumptions and may not translate well to flying vehicles. 

The architectural problem is that flight controllers and GNSS receivers are usually separate physical items. Position data arrives over a serial bus at perhaps 1 to 10 Hz as a simple PVT input, while the IMU is directly connected to the flight controller rather than to the GNSS engine. That separation makes it difficult to build tightly coupled filters that can work directly with raw satellite measurements such as code, Doppler, and carrier phase. By integrating GNSS and flight control in one system, Hyfix asserts that the H1 opens the door to tighter coupling at the estimator layer. 

Tight coupling is not simply a buzzword here. It changes what the estimator can see and when it can see it. Instead of consuming a downstream position fix as a finished product, the filter can work closer to the raw measurement layer and keep timing, inertial data, and satellite observations inside one architecture. That is a fundamentally different proposition from a serially connected PVT-based design. It is also better aligned with flying vehicles, where attitude, heading, velocity, and control interact on faster, more dynamic timescales than they typically do in ground systems. 

TIME SYNCHRONIZATION AS A HIDDEN SYSTEMS BURDEN

GNSS often provides the master clock in autonomous systems through PPS. But once sensors and subsystems are spread across multiple boards, maintaining good time synchronization becomes a material integration chore. Timing drift or inconsistent timestamping across modules can quietly degrade estimator performance even when each subsystem appears healthy in isolation. Hyfix’s position is that bringing more of the navigation, fusion and control chain inside one architecture reduces that burden and makes time coherence easier to preserve. 

DUAL-ANTENNA HEADING MOVES DOWNMARKET

One of the clearest technical examples is heading.

Traditionally, small drones have relied on geomagnetic sensors to estimate heading. That solution is cheap and compact, but it comes with familiar drawbacks. Magnetometers require hard-iron and soft-iron calibration to account for disturbances from batteries, motors, payloads, and surrounding structures. In highly supervised operations, calibration can be managed. In autonomous operations—especially swarms or drone-in-a-box deployments—it becomes much harder to do consistently. The vehicle may also operate near dynamic magnetic disturbances such as cars, bridges, or industrial infrastructure, where no amount of prior calibration completely solves the problem. 

Dual-antenna heading offers a more geometric alternative, but it has historically been reserved for larger and more expensive aircraft because it often required two receiver chains and a longer baseline between antennas. Hyfix’s claim is that H1 changes that trade. The chip includes dual RF input ports and can compute heading directly. Mike Horton, founder and CEO, said H1’s resolution and noise performance are sufficient to achieve heading accuracy on par with a geomagnetic sensor using only a 0.2-meter baseline between antennas—small enough to fit on a sub-250 g mini-drone. 

That detail matters because it brings dual-antenna heading into a class of aircraft where it has not been easy to justify. If the baseline requirement drops enough to fit small airframes, then dual-antenna heading is no longer a large-UAV luxury. It becomes an architectural option for the very aircraft that struggle most with reliable magnetic calibration. Horton’s practical summary is blunt: dual antenna can replace the compass, and even with a short baseline it should be “far better and far more repeatable than a compass.”

From a control standpoint, that has implications beyond heading accuracy alone. But the more important implication may be integrity.

GEOMETRY AS AN INTEGRITY CONSTRAINT

The H1’s dual-antenna architecture is also presented as a built-in check on whether the GNSS solution is believable.

Multipath remains one of the hardest real-world problems in GNSS-enabled autonomy. Signals reflecting from buildings, terrain, vehicles, or industrial structures can produce position solutions that appear plausible while being materially wrong. In loosely coupled architectures, those solutions may be passed downstream with a reassuring figure of merit, such as DOP, even when the data should not be trusted. The fusion engine then weights the wrong input too heavily.

A dual-antenna system introduces another measurement constraint. The physical distance between the antennas is fixed and known. In the positioning engine, that baseline can be computed via moving-base RTK. If the signals entering one or both antennas are distorted by multipath or interference, the measured baseline will deviate from the known geometry.

That inconsistency becomes an integrity signal. It does not eliminate the error source, but it gives the system another reason to suspect that the GNSS-derived solution is slipping. 

Instead of only accepting a single-antenna PVT solution at face value, the system can compare geometry against measurement behavior and ask whether the result is self-consistent. In practice, that is what makes predictable degradation a measurable system behavior.

CORRECTIONS AS PRECISION AND TRUST INFRASTRUCTURE

The H1 treats corrections as more than an accuracy service.

The H1, Horton said, can receive network data for two purposes. The first is familiar: traditional RTK corrections for higher accuracy and ephemeris support for faster convergence. The second is more interesting: network navigation messages can also be used as a check against spoofed navigation data. In other words, corrections are not only there to improve precision. They can also act as a trust layer. 

A receiver that can compare received navigation content against trusted network-delivered ephemeris is in a stronger position to detect inconsistency before it turns into corrupted state estimation. That reframes corrections architecture as part of the system’s integrity design, not just its accuracy budget. 

THE TACTICAL EDGE AND GRACEFUL DEGRADATION

Hyfix places much of this discussion at what it calls the tactical edge: environments with limited power, constrained bandwidth, denser RF conditions, degraded GNSS, and less room for recovery from mistakes. In those settings, the system’s real value lies not only in accuracy but in how well it detects and responds to uncertainty. The ability to constrain error at the source should allow the vehicle to degrade more predictably, relying more intelligently on inertial, visual, or other supporting inputs as conditions change.

Horton describes the handoff in practical terms. The fixed baseline between the two antennas becomes “another very powerful constraint” that helps the system “switch over your sensor fusion, to use IMU, to use camera, to use whatever.” That is a significant observation because it makes clear that the dual-antenna design is not only about heading or RTK. It is part of the trigger logic that helps the fusion engine decide when to trust GNSS less and trust other sources more. 

LEO PNT AND THE NEXT TIMING LAYER

Hyfix points to LEO PNT integration, including Xona, as part of the resilience path. Horton goes further: GEODNET is already tracking Xona signals on base stations around the world, and those signals are said to be 40 to 100 times stronger than traditional GNSS, improving jamming resistance and indoor penetration. The first commercial service from Xona is expected to be a precision timing signal in 2027. 

The most interesting part is not simply signal strength. It is what trusted timing might enable. Horton suggests that a high-power precision timing signal could allow a drone and controller to share nanosecond-accurate time even in the presence of GNSS jamming. That shared time could then be used to do ranging over the data link, adding another range source to help correct visual-odometry errors in GPS-denied environments. When Xona reaches full constellation, the system would also gain a stronger additional resistance to jamming. 

If that model matures, the first major LEO contribution to small-aircraft autonomy may not be position in the classic sense. It may be trusted time, and from trusted time, better synchronization and ranging across the broader autonomy stack.

A DIFFERENT PNT ARCHITECTURE FOR SMALL AUTONOMOUS AIRCRAFT

What H1 ultimately proposes is a reframing of the PNT problem for small autonomous aircraft. The question the industry has been asking—how to add more capable components to the stack—may be less important than the question Hyfix is now pressing: how to build a navigation and control architecture where fewer boundaries between systems means fewer opportunities for hidden error to become visible failure. Tight coupling, dual-antenna integrity, coherent timing, trusted corrections, and LEO-derived resilience are not independent features. They are expressions of the same architectural logic—that autonomy becomes more trustworthy when confidence is modeled as a system property, not assembled from loosely connected parts. That is not a modest claim. But the technical case behind it is serious, and for a PNT community already moving toward assured, layered and application-integrated architectures, it is exactly the right direction to be pushing.

The post From Stack Compression to Trusted Autonomy: The PNT Case Behind Hyfix H1 appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

The conversation around resilient positioning, navigation and timing has changed. Not long ago, much of the discussion centered on architectures, roadmaps and the strategic rationale for bringing timing, inertial navigation, sensor fusion and signal intelligence into a single operational framework. Today, the question is more immediate: How do fielded platforms continue to navigate, synchronize and operate when GPS is jammed, spoofed, degraded or unavailable?

For VIAVI Solutions, that question is no longer theoretical. With its acquisitions of Jackson Labs Technologies and Inertial Labs, VIAVI has assembled a portfolio that spans precision timing, holdover, inertial navigation, sensor fusion and communications-domain expertise. But the clearest expression of that strategy may be a product designed not to replace every system on a vehicle, but to make existing systems more resilient: the VIAVI RSR Transcoder 2.0. 

In an interview with Inside GNSS+, Andrew Popp, Sr. Director of PNT Product Line Management at VIAVI, described a market shift that is moving the transcoder from an innovative retrofit concept into an increasingly adopted solution for military platforms operating in contested environments. The product, he said, is now on 18 different vehicle platforms within the U.S. military, with adoption moving quickly as customers look for practical ways to upgrade navigation resilience without redesigning entire vehicles.

BUILT FOR TODAY’S EW INTENSITY 

That momentum reflects a core reality of modern defense operations. The electronic warfare environment is no longer an occasional complicating factor; it is a baseline condition. Jamming and spoofing are persistent, adaptive and widespread. The result is a growing need for systems that can preserve trusted PNT even when conventional GPS signals cannot be fully trusted—a concern that extends well beyond the battlefield to transportation networks, power grids, financial systems and emergency services that depend on precise timing and geolocation.

The transcoder addresses that need by acting as an interpretive layer between new sources of navigation or timing data and legacy onboard systems. It can accept multiple types of inputs, including NMEA input, ICD-GPS-153 type input, LEO receiver data, inertial navigation inputs and M-Code-capable sources. It then outputs signals that existing vehicle systems already understand, including GPS L1 C/A and L2 P-code.

Rather than forcing a platform owner to rip out existing receivers, rewire a vehicle or wait for a new program of record to deliver a clean-sheet solution, the transcoder allows new PNT capabilities to be introduced through a familiar interface. Existing equipment sees what looks like a GPS signal. Behind that signal, however, may be a more diverse blend of inputs drawn from inertial navigation, military GPS, alternate satellite sources or other aiding systems.

“It works today,” Popp said. That point is central to VIAVI’s positioning. The transcoder is not framed as a long-range development promise or a future architecture dependent on new acquisition cycles. It is a pluggable solution designed for equipment already fielded, already wired and already operating in demanding environments.

That practicality matters because many defense platforms were not built for today’s EW intensity. Legacy navigation systems may still perform well under normal conditions, but they were not designed for a battlespace in which GPS denial can be expected and spoofing can be sophisticated. The challenge is not only to add resilience, but to add it in a way that respects the cost, complexity and readiness constraints of existing fleets.

Popp emphasized that VIAVI paid close attention to integration details. The cabling, power and physical integration were designed to match the realities of the vehicles and systems already in use. In simple terms, the product is meant to fit into the operational environment, not force the operational environment to conform to the product.

That design philosophy helps explain why adoption has extended beyond initial expectations. The transcoder’s value is not limited to a single vehicle class or a narrow set of requirements. While current deployments are land-based, Popp noted the same approach can extend to rotorcraft and other platforms. The key is not the vehicle type; it is the need to translate trusted PNT inputs into a form that onboard systems can use immediately.

The timing element is especially important. In PNT, timing is often less visible than positioning and navigation, but it is foundational to both. Without trusted time, position and navigation degrade quickly. VIAVI’s Jackson Labs heritage gives the company a deep base in precision timing, synchronization and holdover performance, and that expertise is built into the transcoder family.

MISSION MATCHED RESILIENCE 

The transcoder is available in multiple configurations to match different mission needs. Popp described modules that can be embedded into larger solutions, ruggedized enclosure versions, and options with different holdover oscillator capabilities. For critical holdover requirements, VIAVI offers a CSAC option. Other configurations use MEMS-based or OCXO-class approaches, while some versions can operate without an onboard oscillator when a larger vehicle already has a high-quality clock available.

That configurability is not an afterthought. It reflects VIAVI’s view that resilience should be mission-matched rather than overbuilt. Some customers need the highest holdover performance available. Others already have timing assets onboard and simply need the transcoder to ingest and distribute that trusted timing. Still others may want a board-level module to embed inside a broader PNT or navigation solution.

The result is a family of options rather than a one-size-fits-all architecture. That is significant in defense procurement, where over-specifying a solution can be as damaging as under-specifying it. The right answer for a heavy ground vehicle may not be the right answer for a smaller platform, an unmanned system or a contractor-developed navigation suite. VIAVI’s goal is to meet the customer at the level of capability required by the mission.

The same modular thinking applies to sources of position and time. Popp described VIAVI’s posture as source-agnostic. The objective is to use the best available source in the operating environment and deliver that information in a usable form. Today, that can include satellite-based timing sources, Iridium-based services, inertial inputs and M-Code-capable GPS. VIAVI is also evaluating additional sources of opportunity and terrestrial timing approaches as part of a broader strategy to avoid dependence on any single point of failure.

That future-facing design is essential because the PNT landscape is changing quickly. LEO constellations, signals of opportunity, terrestrial timing networks, visual navigation, map matching and other techniques are gaining attention. But each new source creates an integration challenge. New navigation technology is only useful if it can be consumed by the platform that needs it.

This is where the transcoder’s role becomes broader than a single VIAVI product. It can serve as an enabling component for other companies developing more sophisticated INS, visual navigation, north-finding or sensor-fusion systems. If those systems can provide the right input, the transcoder can help translate that capability into a signal format that legacy onboard systems can accept.

A PLATFORM ENABLER 

The transcoder is not only a solution; it is a platform enabler. It allows contractors and integrators to bring new PNT technologies to existing vehicles without requiring each new capability to be deeply integrated into every onboard navigation subsystem. The transcoder becomes the bridge between innovation and adoption.

That bridge is important as operational requirements evolve faster than platform refresh cycles. A vehicle may remain in service for decades, while the threat environment changes in months. Operators need a way to insert new resilience layers quickly, affordably and with minimal disruption. The transcoder provides a path to do that by preserving the installed base while upgrading what the installed base receives.

This also connects the transcoder to VIAVI’s larger PNT strategy. An earlier Inside GNSS+ feature on VIAVI’s integrated PNT vision described a layered ecosystem built from precision timing, inertial navigation, signal awareness, validation and modular integration. The transcoder is one of the most practical expressions of that ecosystem. It turns architectural resilience into something that can be used by systems already in place.

The urgency is being driven by real-world conditions. Customers are responding to the severity, frequency and operational consequences of jamming and spoofing. They are not merely planning for future contested environments; they are trying to operate in them now. That makes ease of integration more than a convenience. It becomes a readiness issue.

The transcoder’s adoption across 18 vehicle platforms suggests the market is responding to that need. VIAVI is also pursuing an NSN number for the product, which would make acquisition easier for government customers. Rapid operational adoption depends not only on technical capability, but on procurement accessibility.

The long-term opportunity may be larger still. NATO-aligned and allied markets face many of the same EW and GNSS-denial challenges as the U.S. military. Because the transcoder is built around accepting diverse inputs and outputting standardized signals, it is not limited to a narrow domestic configuration. Its versatility could make it relevant across allied land, air and integrated defense applications where legacy equipment needs to be upgraded for modern PNT threats.

The counter-UAS mission also underscores the importance of resilient PNT. ISR, targeting, object detection, classification and counter-drone operations all depend on trusted georeferencing. If the platform cannot trust its position, timing or navigation data, downstream mission systems suffer. A resilient PNT layer therefore becomes part of the broader mission chain, not merely a navigation accessory.

ACCELERATING ADOPTION 

VIAVI’s transcoder does not require customers to choose between legacy systems and next-generation navigation. It allows the two to work together. It gives existing platforms a way to consume resilient PNT inputs while giving new technology providers a path into fielded systems.

VIAVI’s message is simple: Customers should not have to replace everything to become more resilient. They should be able to use the best available sources of time and position, combine them as the mission requires, and deliver them to existing systems in a form those systems can trust.

In a battlespace defined by jamming, spoofing and uncertainty, that is powerful. Resilience is no longer just about having more sensors or more expensive clocks. It is about integration, translation and flexibility. It is about ensuring when one source is degraded or denied, another can be used.

VIAVI’s transcoder sits precisely at that intersection. It connects old and new, GPS and non-GPS, timing and navigation, platform constraints and mission urgency. For military users confronting today’s EW environment, that may be the difference between a promising PNT architecture and a capability that can be fielded now. 

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The models support L1/E1 + L2/E5b and L1/E1 + L5/E5a respectively, giving customers dual-band frequency coverage aligned with current and next-generation multi-frequency GNSS receiver architectures.

Both antennas carry Calian’s extended filtering plus interference mitigation performance, including mitigation of three jamming sources per band, integrated XF+ filtering for out-of-band rejection and cross-band isolation, and real-time situational awareness messaging. GPS and Galileo signals are supported across both models.

“GNSS resilience is essential for mission success,” said Christopher Russell, Vice President of Global Sales and Growth at Calian’s GNSS division. “With these additional frequency and installation mounting options added, customers gain flexible, advanced anti-jamming protection tailored to their specific system needs.”

Both antennas will be on display at Calian Booth 207 at the Joint Navigation Conference, June 2–3, at the Northern Kentucky Convention Center in Covington, Kentucky.

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The company announced the product on the opening day of the Joint Navigation Conference in Covington, Kentucky, where VIAVI is exhibiting at Booth 407.

The GDO-1000 combines dual-frequency L1/L5 GNSS reception with microsecond-class 24-hour holdover from a MEMS-based oscillator — positioning it as an alternative to chip-scale atomic clocks, which VIAVI says face increasing cost and supply chain pressure across defense procurements. The MEMS oscillator delivers thermal stability across the full military temperature range and sustained phase noise and Allan Deviation performance under vibration and shock. Patented AI and ML algorithms, developed by the Jackson Labs team now part of VIAVI, predict and compensate for oscillator behavior across environmental conditions. The module draws approximately half a watt and accepts an external 1PPS input, allowing it to be disciplined by M-Code GPS or alternative navigation sources without hardware modification.

“The GDO-1000 offers a new path that doesn’t force customers to compromise,” said Doug Russell, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Aerospace and Defense at VIAVI. “Its holdover performance approaches what customers expect from atomic-class clocks, in a module that fits on a standard M.2 slot and draws approximately half a watt.”

VIAVI staff will also present on a cesium-less ePRTC solution for homeland critical infrastructure timing as part of the JNC technical program.

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The milestone is notable for being free-space rather than fiber-based, a distinction the company says is a critical step toward operational deployment in environments where physical infrastructure is unavailable.

The fully integrated Ares terminal is designed to combine 10 Gbps free-space optical communications, entangled photon distribution for timing and encryption key sharing, and a stable clock ensemble disciplined by Xairos’ Quantum Time Transfer technology. The system targets RF- and GPS-denied environments, and the company has cited precision synchronization for distributed sensors and antennas — including applications relevant to Golden Dome-style architectures requiring geolocation and data fusion for fire control — as representative use cases.

The announcement follows Xairos’ completion last week of Phase 1 of the UK’s £1.4 million Innovate UK Quantum PNT Mission under the TimeLink programme, which advanced the company’s Athena product line for GNSS-independent timing in critical infrastructure. The company is also the technology provider for the Colorado Quantum Incubator’s planned national quantum timing testbed, announced in April. Next steps for the Ares terminal include further development under the Colorado Quantum Incubator’s Quantum Timing Center program.

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The Maryland-based company, which develops DAPS GEN II under a U.S. Army Program of Record, will highlight a new mounted capability designed to extend the system’s Assured PNT performance into vehicle-integrated environments.

The centerpiece of the update is a Vehicle Interface Adapter under development that secures the DAPS GEN II unit within a vehicle platform, conditions vehicle power to extend battery life, expands the number of supported clients from a single Assured PNT feed, and provides RF and data interfaces to anti-jam antennas — including the ability to share electronic warfare situational awareness information. A FLEX-IO port supports future sensor integration and simplifies transition of new PNT capabilities as they become available. The adapter follows a modular, open architecture intended to support multiple vehicle types.

DAPS GEN II uses multi-layer sensor fusion across a diverse set of positioning and timing sources to maintain navigation continuity in GPS-degraded, jammed, or denied environments. TRX will present technical results from both dismounted and mounted testing in two Session C6 presentations on Tuesday morning: one covering program advancements and interoperability with co-presenter Combat Ready PNT, and a second addressing the mounted enhancement specifically. The company will also be at Booth 319 during the exhibition.

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Aviation Week, which first reported the provision, noted the HASC language cited “a concerning lack of clear direction” across the portfolio. The full committee is scheduled to formally mark up the bill on June 4.

The provision follows a period of sustained congressional attention to PNT enterprise management. A 2022 Government Accountability Office report found that DoD’s PNT Oversight Council — a statutorily established senior-level body tri-chaired by the Under Secretaries of Defense for Research and Engineering and for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — had not established strategic objectives or measurable metrics for alternative PNT programs. The report noted the council had directed its focus primarily toward GPS modernization, and recommended that defined objectives and metrics be developed to track progress on complementary capabilities. Language in the proposed FY26 defense spending bill referenced a classified 2024 Defense Science Board report that had recommended the Pentagon develop jam-resistant user equipment and strengthen the ground control segment.

The timing of the FY27 provision reflects a broader moment of transition in the GPS architecture. On April 21, the Space Force completed the GPS III constellation with the launch of Space Vehicle 10 — designated GPS III-8 and informally named “Hedy Lamarr” — aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 from Cape Canaveral. The ten-satellite GPS III modernization phase is now fully on orbit, delivering a three-fold improvement in positional accuracy and an eight-fold improvement in jam resistance over legacy GPS satellites. Lockheed Martin received a $105 million ground control modernization contract from the Space Force in April to support the transition to the 22-satellite GPS IIIF follow-on series.

Planning for additional layers of PNT capability continues across several programs. The Space Development Agency has paused plans to integrate PNT capabilities into its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture constellation pending further budgetary guidance. Space Systems Command’s Resilient GPS program had entered an early design phase with Astranis, Axient, L3Harris and Sierra Space, but the Space Force has since canceled the proliferated smallsat layer, citing FY26 budget priorities. The Phase 0 design work may inform future GPS architecture decisions, but the program will not proceed to on-orbit demonstrations. DARPA and the Defense Innovation Unit are also pursuing quantum-based PNT technologies that could support positioning independent of space-based signals, though those efforts remain in research and prototype stages.

The FY27 NDAA provision would consolidate oversight of these programs — GPS modernization, alternative PNT development, and resilience efforts across the services — under a single designated official. The bill also proposes eliminating the Space Development Agency and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office as standalone entities, changes that would further reshape how space-based PNT programs are managed and acquired across the department.

The HASC markup on June 4 will be the next test of whether the PNT language survives the amendment process intact, and how the Senate Armed Services Committee responds in its own markup expected the following week.

The June 4 markup coincides with a separate hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, titled “Where Are We?: Examining Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities in the United States,” which will examine GPS resilience for civilian infrastructure including banking, energy, and transportation.

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When Justin Deifel sat down with Inside GNSS at XPONENTIAL, it was his first media interview since joining Xona as vice president of government programs. The setting was fitting. Xona is moving Pulsar, its low Earth orbit (LEO) PNT service, toward operational status at a time when government, defense, infrastructure and commercial users are reassessing long-standing dependence on GNSS alone.

Deifel joined Xona in May after a career across the U.S. Space Force, Air Force, national security space and intelligence communities. His recent assignments included chief of staff for PEO Space Sensing, squadron commander and materiel leader for Resilient GPS, program manager and materiel leader for the Military SATCOM and PNT Directorate Futures division, and leadership roles supporting MUOS, the Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization and future GPS capabilities. Earlier, he worked at Edwards Air Force Base on test range capabilities and flight test programs, deployed to Afghanistan in support of air operations, led U.S. government and commercial testing related to terrestrial network interference with GPS, and managed elements of the GPS III space vehicle program. 

“Rapid innovation in launch and satellite communications has shown that commercial companies can deliver capability at the speed of relevance,” Deifel said. “Xona is bringing that same approach to rethinking positioning, navigation and timing for the modern era with Pulsar.”

For Deifel, resilient PNT is no longer a future planning problem. “Over the past year, Xona has demonstrated on orbit what many inside government long believed would be impossible: broadcasting a new navigation signal alongside GPS while materially improving signal strength, precision and protection against jamming and spoofing,” he said. “Resilient PNT is not a future requirement. It is an operational requirement now, and Pulsar will be an important part of how that resilience gets delivered.” 

That view reflects Deifel’s experience inside government programs, where promising capability can take years to field. He does not describe Pulsar as a replacement for GPS, GNSS, M-Code or other resilient PNT efforts, but as one layer in a broader architecture.

“Resilient PNT is not an either-or discussion,” he said. “Users benefit from multiple independent sources of PNT capability working together.” 

Pulsar broadcasts in L-band, like GPS, which Deifel said means many existing GNSS devices can add support through software updates rather than new hardware. That integration path is central to his assessment of how new PNT capabilities become useful at scale.

“Having spent years inside government programs, the gap between promising technology and fielded operational capability is often underestimated,” he said. “Adoption depends on integration burden, cost, timelines, and whether users can realistically deploy it across various applications with different requirements.” 

He pointed to M-Code as an example. Although M-Code has been broadcasting since 2005, he said, the government and industry are still building and integrating the user equipment needed to support it, delaying important capability for warfighters. 

Deifel connected those fielding realities to current electronic warfare conditions and drone operations. Many platforms, particularly smaller or attritable systems, need resilient PNT at a size, scale and price traditional modernization pathways may struggle to serve. He described Xona as part of the “future infrastructure,” citing higher power, signal diversity and GPS independence as capabilities increasingly needed by both national security and commercial users. 

“The time is now to begin thinking beyond a single-source PNT architecture,” Deifel said. “Pulsar’s capability will make a measurable difference in performance well before the full constellation is complete, and its value will only increase over time.” 

Recent testing with commercial receiver partners, he added, has shown even one Pulsar satellite augmenting GNSS can improve urban availability and multipath performance, while enabling coarse-location authentication to help mitigate spoofing. 

Max Eunice, a Xona spokesperson, said Deifel joins as Pulsar approaches operational status, with Xona’s manufacturing facility in place and its first production batch of satellites scheduled to launch in October.

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