The order supports first unit equipped to TRX Systems.

The DME systems covered by the order will be integrated into medium and heavy tactical vehicles next year, with fielding led by PM PNT.

“We’re excited to introduce DME to our soldiers in the field who need it most,” said Chris Jais, project manager for PM PNT. “We developed DME to give soldiers on combat support and combat service support vehicles an Assured PNT solution that best fit their needs and provides a bridge between mounted and dismounted platforms.”

DME combines satellite receivers, an anti-jam antenna and inertial-based navigation to deliver Assured PNT to U.S. soldiers and allies. The system includes a Military Code GPS receiver capable of anti-spoofing, a commercial multi-GNSS receiver, and an alternative complementary PNT source antenna to provide location data in GPS-contested and -denied environments.

The full DME package consists of two kits: an A-kit containing bracketry and cables unique to each platform, and a B-kit consisting of the system components — the DAPS handheld device, vehicle interface adaptor, and antennas.

Delivery of the DME B-kits for first unit equipped is expected by mid-2027.

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TrustPoint announced Aug. 25 that it has demonstrated its C-band navigation signals operating through GNSS interference on an enhanced receiver built by NovAtel, part of Hexagon, under a contract with Naval Air Systems Command.

The demonstration confirmed that TrustPoint’s C-band signals can be acquired, tracked and used to generate precise positioning data in environments where GPS is degraded or denied, work conducted under a Small Business Innovation Research Phase II contract led by the Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division. TrustPoint described the result as evidence that its service can meet the growing demand among defense operators for navigation that continues to function under modern electronic warfare conditions.

A Receiver the Industry Already Trusts

By integrating C-band capability into an existing NovAtel GNSS receiver rather than requiring new hardware, the companies said the result advances a path toward receivers that can fall back on C-band signals when GNSS is compromised, and marks a step forward for the broader navigation industry’s move toward C-band-enabled GNSS solutions. TrustPoint and Hexagon framed the milestone as bringing together TrustPoint’s resilient C-band service with a receiver platform already established and trusted across the industry, rather than an entirely new, unproven piece of hardware.

Patrick Shannon, founder and CEO of TrustPoint, said “C-band signals have operated through interference on a receiver the industry already trusts,” calling the result a new baseline for resilient positioning, navigation and timing, and adding that the companies now intend to build on the demonstrated capability.

Sandy Kennedy, vice president of research and development for Hexagon’s Aerospace and Defence Division, credited NovAtel’s reputation for high-performance receiver technology trusted in demanding environments, and said the collaboration shows how the company continues evolving its products to support emerging signals beyond L-band, part of what she described as a long-term commitment to PNT innovation and to partners across the industry.

TrustPoint said the achievement gives defense, aerospace and autonomous-systems developers an early proof point that its C-band service can complement existing GNSS approaches while speeding the path toward deployable, resilient PNT.

Part of a Broader Milestone Track Record

The demonstration builds on a string of earlier milestones for TrustPoint, including the company’s first live-sky transmission and real-time reception of a C-band GNSS signal in 2025, also conducted with Hexagon, the first C-band ground-to-space PNT demonstration, and the launch and operation of three commercial free-flying GNSS satellites. TrustPoint has positioned the C-band service as a scalable, GPS-independent alternative to GPS for autonomous systems, critical infrastructure and national security applications.

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Microchip Technology on Aug. 13 introduced the Space CSAC-SA65, a radiation-tolerant chip-scale atomic clock designed to bring atomic-clock timing accuracy to small, power-constrained satellite missions.

The company said the growing New Space market is driving demand for smaller, less expensive space hardware supporting short-duration missions in applications such as satellite-to-cellular communications, alternative navigation and Earth imaging. Built on the heritage of Microchip’s Space CSAC-SA45, the new device extends radiation tolerance to at least 30 kRad and operates across an extended temperature range of -40 degrees C to +80 degrees C. It consumes less than 120 mW and occupies under 17 cubic centimeters, with built-in 1 PPS input and output for satellite synchronization. The atomic stability lets systems maintain timing accuracy for extended periods without continuous reliance on GNSS signals.

Randy Brudzinski, corporate vice president of Microchip’s frequency and time systems business unit, said the device brings atomic-clock performance to size-, weight-, power- and cost-constrained applications, adding that “even the smallest CubeSat can now fly with atomic accuracy.”

COTS Manufacturing, LEO Applications

Manufactured as a commercial off-the-shelf product using radiation-tolerant commercial electronic components, the CSAC-SA65 is intended to offer shorter lead times and lower overall costs compared with traditional space-grade oscillators. Microchip is targeting the device at Low Earth Orbit missions, including satellite timing and frequency control, satellite clock reference, assured positioning, navigation and timing, and satellite cross-linking.

The company describes its original Space CSAC line as the industry’s first commercially available radiation-tolerant chip-scale atomic clock, and positions the SA65 generation as a further step in reducing size, weight and power for LEO applications spanning commercial, scientific and defense payloads. The device, part number 090-02789-007, is available now through Microchip’s sales and distribution network, supported by the company’s Clockstudio software for control and analysis of atomic clocks and a CSAC Developer Kit.

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Javad GNSS on Aug. 12 introduced a new GNSS+INS product line built to keep navigation systems operating when GPS signals are jammed, spoofed or denied.

The US-based receiver manufacturer built the line by pairing its multi-constellation GNSS receivers with commercial and defense-grade IMU modules through a purpose-built interface board, creating a turnkey navigation system for OEMs. The board manages the electrical connection, time synchronization and data path between the receiver and IMU, work integrators previously had to handle themselves when sourcing components separately, choosing instead between a sealed GNSS+INS box built around a single fixed inertial sensor or a fully custom integration effort.

A Configurable Inertial Choice

The inertial sensor remains a configurable choice rather than a fixed component, letting Javad match the IMU to a program’s grade, dynamic range and cost requirements without compromising the performance of the underlying GNSS unit. Current configurations support gyro dynamic ranges up to plus-or-minus 2,000 degrees per second, in-run gyro bias stability between 0.7 and 2 degrees per hour, and accelerometer ranges from plus-or-minus 8g to plus-or-minus 40g.

Gary Walker, executive vice president at Javad GNSS, said the configuration means integrators “can get GNSS performance and anti-jam protection” while still choosing the inertial sensor that fits their program.

Javad designs and manufactures its GNSS receivers in-house at its San Jose, California facility, building on the company’s proprietary TRIUMPH ASIC technology, which the company has marketed for its patented spoofing and jamming detection since introducing the chip’s high channel-count architecture roughly a decade ago. The GNSS+INS configuration is available now for evaluation and integration by qualified users.

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Infinite Electronics, a global platform of connectivity manufacturing companies, will debut a new lineup of Pasternack multi-constellation GNSS antennas with anti-jamming technology at Commercial UAV Expo 2026, taking place Sept. 1-3 in Las Vegas. The company says the antennas are designed to improve positioning, navigation and timing performance in increasingly congested RF environments.

Gorden Cook, president and general manager of the RF and Microwave Business Unit at Infinite Electronics, said reliable GNSS positioning has become increasingly important as UAV platforms are deployed in more demanding commercial, industrial and public safety applications, and that the new antennas are built to help customers maintain reliable positioning in challenging RF conditions.

Multi-Constellation Coverage With MIL-Grade Filtering

The antennas support GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou, QZSS, NavIC and regional augmentation systems across the L1/E1/B1, L2 and L5/E5 frequency bands. Infinite Electronics says its interference mitigation technology suppresses low-elevation jamming sources and rejects adjacent-band interference, helping maintain receiver performance; the antennas are built to MIL-STD-810 standards for outdoor use in fixed, mobile and infrastructure-based systems.

The company positions the new line as an additional option for UAV manufacturers, integrators and operators looking to improve positioning reliability in crowded RF environments, expanding Pasternack’s broader portfolio of GNSS, RF and positioning solutions for autonomous and unmanned systems, mission-critical navigation, precision timing, transportation, public safety, critical infrastructure and geospatial applications.

At Commercial UAV Expo, attendees can visit the Infinite Electronics booth (Booth 849) to see the antennas alongside other connectivity products across the company’s brand portfolio, including RF and microwave components, rugged networking, surge protection and sealed power and signal connectivity from Pasternack, L-com, Transtector, PolyPhaser and Bulgin for UAV platforms, ground stations and mission-critical communications.

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Furuno Electric announced July 28 that it plans to release the RCB-100 GNSS timing receiver in November 2026, packaging carrier-grade time synchronization performance into a standard RCB form factor designed for simpler integration into low-volume equipment.

The receiver draws on technology developed for Furuno’s GT-100 GNSS module, which the company describes as having built an extensive track record of adoption in the base station and telecommunications infrastructure markets. The GT-100 supports dual-frequency reception on the L1 and L5 bands and achieves timing stability under 4.5 nanoseconds, using an anti-multipath algorithm developed with NTT called Dynamic Satellite Selection to minimize timing degradation in urban environments where GNSS antennas may be placed near windows or amid signal reflections. The module supports GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou, QZSS and SBAS constellations and can automatically mitigate jamming while notifying users in real time of the interfering signal’s frequency and strength.

Carrier-Grade Performance Without Custom RF Design

The RCB-100 delivers that same nanosecond-level accuracy and interference resilience in a format that eliminates the need for dedicated RF circuit design or PCB-level module mounting. Instead of soldering and reflow assembly, the unit installs with screws and a mating connector, and uses a standard SMB antenna connector to minimize RF line design work.

Furuno said the design addresses a persistent barrier for equipment manufacturers: the higher the required GNSS performance, the greater the engineering overhead required for integration, a challenge particularly acute for low-volume products where a custom design is not cost-effective. Target applications for the RCB-100 include telecommunications base stations, time servers, data center systems, financial trading systems, power grid infrastructure and broadcasting equipment, sectors where precise time synchronization underpins critical operations. The company said it will extend the trust established through GT-100 to a wider range of equipment and applications for critical infrastructure through a broader product lineup designed to accommodate customers’ implementation environments.

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The project, ‘ADAS technology and PNT’, was led by Acitoflux GmbH and examined the relationship between PNT capabilities and emerging automated-driving applications across the European and Canadian technology landscape. Rather than focusing on positioning accuracy alone, the study assessed the requirements for PNT that can remain continuously usable, trustworthy and verifiable across the operational design domain (ODD) of an automated system.

The study combined technology scouting, industry research, expert input and use-case analysis. Acitoflux screened and long-listed 331 companies across the PNT and ADAS/AD ecosystem, covering vehicle manufacturers, Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers, GNSS and correction services, localization and positioning, mapping, timing and V2X (vehicle-to-everything).

A central element was a gap analysis based on ten PNT dimensions, covering technical performance, signal quality and resilience, and economic deployment and viability. Forty-nine use cases were re-evaluated, with twenty-four non-TRL9 use cases taken forward for detailed analysis.

From accuracy to trust

At a recent ESA-hosted event, Lennart Säger, Mika Mänz and Marc Halft of Acitoflux presented the final results of the project. Their analysis found that accuracy and precision are not the principal PNT bottlenecks for emerging ADAS/AD applications. Instead, availability, robustness and verification were identified as the main gaps.

Automated systems must be able to determine not simply where they are, but how much confidence can be placed in that position under changing conditions such as urban canyons, tunnels, dense canopy, construction sites and RF-hostile environments.

The study identified several technology trends. Multi-constellation, multi-frequency GNSS is becoming the baseline, while tightly coupled GNSS/INS with motion constraints is emerging as a standard building block for autonomy-oriented localization. RTK is considered operationally mature, while PPP and PPP-RTK are identified as growth areas. Alternative localization technologies, including camera- and LiDAR-based methods, SLAM and high-grade inertial and wheel-odometry systems, are increasingly viewed as complementary rather than replacements for GNSS.

The team used these findings to identify potential future research activities. These include fleet-sourced GNSS risk intelligence, under-glass PNT and sensor integration for automated vehicles, and national or cross-border PNT resilience maps and interference monitoring.

The next challenge for automotive PNT, it would seem, is likely to be less about achieving another increment in nominal accuracy than about delivering trusted, validated and scalable positioning performance that an automated vehicle can use to make operational decisions

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Public GPS interference maps have become an essential awareness tool for tracking GNSS disruptions worldwide. Services like GPSJAM and GPSwise display interference data derived from aircraft broadcasts, helping aviation professionals and infrastructure operators understand where interference events occur. In 2025 alone, analysts documented over 1,500 flights affected by GPS interference daily, with more than 122,000 flights impacted in the first four months of the year, according to industry tracking.

Yet, these powerful visualization tools are frequently misunderstood. The same maps that raise awareness also create dangerous misconceptions when viewers assume they represent ground-level RF conditions or comprehensive threat coverage. This article explains what GNSS interference maps derived from Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data actually measure, why their limitations matter, and how critical infrastructure operators can avoid common interpretation errors that lead to complacency or misallocated resources.

How ADS-B Based GNSS Interference Detection Works

Understanding the data source is essential before interpreting any GPS interference map. Public interference maps rely on various ADS-B data sources, including networks like ADS-B Exchange and OpenSky Network. ADS-B is a surveillance technology where aircraft determine their position using GPS and periodically broadcast it to ground stations and other aircraft.

These maps primarily rely on navigation quality indicators embedded in ADS-B messages, specifically Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) and Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp). When multiple aircraft in the same region simultaneously report degraded accuracy, the system flags a potential jamming zone. This method effectively detects jamming because interference causes measurable signal degradation that aircraft avionics report through these standard parameters.

Different services offer different detection capabilities. GPSJAM aggregates NIC/NACp indicators into hexagonal grids colored by severity, detecting jamming through signal degradation patterns. Their documentation explicitly states that colors represent the percentage of aircraft reporting low navigation accuracy within each hex. GPSwise, developed by SkAI Data Services, uses the OpenSky Network to detect both jamming (via NIC degradation) and spoofing (via trajectory anomalies such as position jumps or aircraft converging on false coordinates). This distinction matters: Jamming detection through signal degradation is well-established, while spoofing detection through trajectory analysis remains more experimental.

Three Common Misconceptions About GNSS Interference Maps

When context is missing, these valuable awareness tools create beliefs that are not just wrong but operationally dangerous. Based on conversations with infrastructure operators and GNSS professionals, three misconceptions recur most frequently:

Misconception 1: “This is Only an Aviation Problem.”

Because interference maps use aircraft as sensors, many observers frame GNSS disruption as exclusively an aviation issue. Pilots deal with it. Airlines reroute. The narrative stops there. This framing dramatically underestimates the threat. Aviation happens to provide a convenient, global measurement network. The aircraft is a sensor platform, not the only affected domain. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has documented critical infrastructure dependencies on GPS timing across financial services, telecommunications and electric power sectors. When aircraft detect interference at altitude, the RF environment near the source may be affecting timing servers, cellular base stations, and grid monitoring systems that lack aviation-style navigation redundancy.

Misconception 2: ”We Are Always in Red, But Nothing Happens.”

Infrastructure operators in regions with persistent interference often observe their location marked red on these maps while their systems appear to function normally. The conclusion seems logical: either their systems are resilient, or the threat is exaggerated. Both conclusions can be wrong. The critical distinction is altitude. Aircraft observe a different RF environment than ground receivers. At cruise altitude (8,000 to 12,000 meters), an aircraft antenna has line-of-sight to interference sources over hundreds of kilometers. A ground-level timing receiver with a rooftop antenna may experience completely different conditions due to terrain, buildings and antenna orientation. GPSJAM’s own FAQ addresses this directly: “I live in a red hex and my phone GPS worked” is not a contradiction. It demonstrates that the map does not describe your personal ground-level environment.

Misconception 3: “Planes Aren’t Crashing, So There’s No Real Danger.”

Aviation has redundancy: inertial systems, distance measuring equipment, ground-based navaids, and trained crews. When GPS fails, aircraft can typically continue safely using backup navigation. This resilience creates a dangerous inference: If aviation handles it, the threat must be manageable. The logic inverts causality. If interference is powerful enough to degrade aircraft-reported GNSS integrity at altitude (where signals from the interference source have propagated through long distances and atmospheric attenuation), then the signal power near the source at ground level may be severe. A jammer affecting aircraft at 10 km altitude is projecting substantial RF power. Ground systems in the jammer’s vicinity, particularly those without aviation-grade redundancy, face potentially greater exposure.

What ADS-B Based Maps Cannot Show

Understanding the boundaries of ADS-B based detection helps operators assess what additional monitoring they need. These maps fundamentally cannot show several critical factors.

First, they cannot provide ground-level RF conditions at specific sites. A timing server, RTK base station, or telecom tower experiences local RF propagation that no aircraft flying overhead can measure.

Second, they cannot detect all interference types. Low-power, localized jammers may affect ground systems without triggering aircraft indicators. Academic research on ADS-B detection emphasizes that unknown aircraft installation details, antenna patterns, and fuselage attenuation all affect what aircraft can observe. Because of all these factors, aircraft-based monitoring can detect only high-power interference.

The temporal aggregation also matters. Most maps aggregate data over time windows, meaning a brief but intense interference event can paint a hex red even though GPS functioned normally for most of the day.

The Role of Ground-Based Monitoring

The gap between aircraft-based awareness and ground-level reality highlights a fundamental challenge. Unlike GNSS interference detection based on ADS-B data, ground-based sensors measure the actual RF environment at the location where protection matters.

This is where centralized ground-based monitoring becomes essential. While ADS-B data captures interference visible to aircraft at altitude, 99% of GNSS-dependent infrastructure operates at ground level. Timing servers in data centers, cellular base stations, power grid synchronization units, and financial trading systems all rely on GNSS signals received at ground level, where propagation conditions differ significantly from what aircraft experience at cruise altitude.

Ground-based monitoring sensors installed at critical infrastructure sites measure the actual RF environment where timing and positioning matter. They detect interference that may never reach aircraft antennas, including low-power jammers operating in urban environments or localized interference targeting specific facilities. A centralized monitoring architecture allows operators to correlate events across multiple sites, identify patterns, and respond to interference that aircraft-based systems simply cannot see.

How ADS-B Maps and Ground Monitoring Complement Each Other

ADS-B based maps and ground-level monitoring serve complementary rather than competing functions. A responsible approach treats them as layers in a complete awareness strategy.

ADS-B maps excel at regional awareness. They show where high-power GNSS disruption is occurring at scale, identify recurring hot zones, track the geographic spread of interference events, and build the case for resilience investment with visual evidence that non-specialists can understand.

Ground-level sensors provide site-specific truth. Only a sensor at your location measures the RF environment your systems experience. Ground sensors provide the detection latency, classification accuracy, and historical logging needed for operational response and post-incident analysis.

Correlating both creates complete situational awareness. When an ADS-B map shows your region as active, ground sensors can confirm or refute local impact. When ground sensors detect interference that does not appear on ADS-B maps, you have identified localized activity that aircraft-based systems miss. This correlation capability becomes particularly valuable for post-event analysis and developing mitigation strategies.

Conclusion

The proliferation of GNSS interference maps derived from ADS-B data represents a significant advance in threat awareness. With GPS jamming affecting hundreds of incidents daily in 2025, visibility into the problem has never been greater. But visibility is not protection, and awareness tools become dangerous when they create false confidence.

The core message for infrastructure operators is straightforward. ADS-B based maps show high-power GNSS disruption is occurring, where it recurs, and that the problem is growing. They do not show whether your specific ground-level site is affected, how your timing systems respond, or whether low-power interference is silently degrading your operations.

As GNSS interference transitions from a niche concern to an operational reality affecting aviation, telecom, finance, and energy sectors, the organizations that understand both what these maps show and what they hide will be best positioned to maintain resilient operations. The first step is recognizing that a red hex on a screen is a starting point for investigation, not a conclusion about your specific infrastructure. 

Author

Maksim Barodzka is the CEO and founder of GPSPATRON. Since 2012, he has been active in IT entrepreneurship, with a strong focus on embedded systems, real-time monitoring and RF/GNSS technologies. In 2018, he founded GPSPATRON, a company developing GNSS interference detection and classification systems designed to detect, analyze and support mitigation of sophisticated GNSS jamming and spoofing threats.

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The trial, conducted in June 2026 across multiple UK sites with support from QinetiQ, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Royal Navy experimentation vessel XV Patrick Blackett, paired Saab’s Giraffe 1X radar with Aquark’s AQlock cold-atom quantum clock. Multiple radars operating at separate locations tracked live targets while relying solely on independent AQlock timing references rather than GPS.

Distributed radar networks depend on timing precision to within billionths of a second to fuse tracking data from separated sensors into a single accurate picture; an error in timing translates directly into an error in target position. GNSS normally supplies that reference, but its signals are vulnerable to jamming and spoofing in contested environments.

To test resilience, the team introduced controlled timing errors simulating GNSS spoofing and denial. According to Saab, the radars continued generating a single air picture throughout, showing predictable performance degradation during the disruption and rapid recovery once synchronization was restored. DSTL functioned as network rebroadcast nodes to distribute the AQlock timing signals across the radar sites.

Saab said it believes the trial to be the first demonstration of a distributed high-performance military radar network maintaining a coherent operational picture using independent quantum timing sources.

“This trial is a great example of how collaboration can accelerate innovation. By combining quantum timing technology with Saab’s advanced Giraffe 1X radar system, we have demonstrated a practical capability that could help customers continue to operate effectively when it matters most,” said Andy Fraser, Group Managing Director at Saab UK.

The trial marks the third collaboration between Aquark and the Royal Navy’s DCTO, following an earlier sea trial in which the AQlock ran continuously aboard HMS Pursuer in the Solent for three days. Aquark’s work under the Royal Navy’s Quantum Optimised Radar project began in December 2025.

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Led by GMV UK, LUPIN addressed a fundamental limitation of conventional lunar navigation. Existing approaches have relied heavily on relative sensors such as inertial measurement units (IMUs) and visual odometry (VO), which provide continuous motion information but accumulate errors over time. Meanwhile, absolute fixes can depend on computationally intensive terrain matching or intermittent Earth-based tracking. Emerging lunar radio-navigation services such as the Moonlight lunar communication and navigation service (LCNS) offer the possibility of GNSS-like absolute positioning around the Moon.

LUPIN combined these capabilities in a tightly coupled multisensor architecture called ANIME. Its PNT engine uses an extended Kalman filter to fuse IMU measurements with RF-based absolute positioning, visual odometry, star-tracker attitude measurements and digital elevation model (DEM) aiding. The architecture can operate in an Earth configuration using real GNSS measurements or a Moon configuration using simulated LCNS/lunar GNSS data.

A giant leap in lunar navigation

To support realistic testing, the project developed LUSIM, a simulation environment that converts terrestrial rover trajectories into representative lunar scenarios. LUSIM generates synthetic LCNS/GNSS pseudorange, Doppler and carrier-to-noise measurements while modelling visibility, satellite geometry, signal errors and failures. This enabled the ANIME filter to be evaluated under lunar-specific RF conditions without requiring an actual lunar navigation infrastructure.

The system was tested on GMV’s RAPID rover platform. Following shakedown trials in Oxfordshire, final field testing took place in Fuerteventura, Canary Islands, including daytime and nighttime operations and different rover speeds.

The results, presented at a recent ESA-hosted event, indicate the potential of the hybrid approach. Across the test campaign, the best 95th-percentile, three-dimensional position error was below 6 meters in the Earth configuration and below 8 meters in the Moon configuration. Corresponding velocity errors were below 0.1 and 0.2 m/s, respectively, while attitude errors remained below 2 degrees.

Importantly, LUPIN found that RF geometry and signal availability remain the dominant determinants of performance. Relative sensors improved continuity and robustness but did not substantially improve absolute positioning. Three RF measurements together with DEM constraints were required for stable dynamic operation.

The results suggest LCNS could provide a direct link between a rover’s local map and a global lunar reference frame, enabling longer and faster traverses with reduced operational complexity. Future work will address multi-constellation availability, differential corrections to mitigate RF signal-in-space errors, tighter integration with rover guidance, navigation and control, and potential LunaNet-compatible receiver development.

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