VIAVI Solutions and Ground Control have announced a partnership to integrate VIAVI’s Secure µPNT STL-1000 receiver module into Ground Control’s RockFLEET Assured maritime tracking and navigation platform, targeting vessels operating in GNSS-denied or contested environments.

The Secure µPNT STL-1000 is a compact, software-defined receiver that operates through VIAVI’s SecureTime altGNSS LEO service tier rather than relying on GPS/GNSS constellations. The module delivers precise timing with holdover capability — meaning it can maintain synchronization through signal outages — and is designed for what the defense sector terms Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environments, or D3SOE. Its integration into RockFLEET Assured provides a secondary, independent position source alongside or in lieu of conventional GNSS, with the stated aim of sustaining navigation and vessel oversight when primary signals are jammed, spoofed, or otherwise unavailable.

“With jamming and spoofing now a core element of cyber warfare, resilient PNT solutions are no longer optional,” said Doug Russell, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Aerospace and Defense, at VIAVI. “Its compact size and low power consumption makes it ideal for applications that require an extremely small, low-power, secure, resilient embedded PNT receiver.”

Alastair MacLeod, CEO of Ground Control, framed the integration in terms of both commercial and defense exposure. “As the frequency of jamming and spoofing continues to rise, reliance on GPS/GNSS signals alone increasingly exposes both commercial and military operations to risk,” he said. “Integrating VIAVI’s Secure µPNT STL-1000 into RockFLEET Assured delivers a trusted secondary position source, strengthening resilience for mission-critical operations across defense, maritime and critical infrastructure environments.”

RockFLEET Assured is described as a marine-grade Assured PNT (A-PNT) solution. VIAVI, headquartered in Chandler, Arizona, and traded on Nasdaq as VIAV, positions itself as a provider of test, measurement, and optical technologies across defense, aerospace, and communications infrastructure markets.

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The Munich Space Summit remains one of the premier gatherings on the European space calendar, showcasing the accomplishments of leading industry players and policymakers. The Americans show up, too.

Despite current geopolitical strains, Europeans and Americans in the PNT and space communities continue to meet as collaborators, colleagues and, in many cases, longstanding friends. Conferences such as the Munich Space Summit are stronger for that transatlantic exchange.

One of the event’s key sessions, featuring program updates from the major satellite navigation providers, was moderated by Richard Fischer, publisher at U.S.-based Autonomous Media, the company behind Inside GNSS, Inside Unmanned Systems, Inside Autonomous Vehicles and xyHt.

“What strikes me most this year,” Fischer said, “is that the conversation around GNSS has clearly moved beyond constellation updates alone. Across the community, there is growing recognition that GNSS is critical infrastructure. It is no longer enough to think only in terms of accuracy and coverage. The language now is resilience, trust, authentication, continuity and assurance.”

Among the most anticipated appearances at the Summit was that of Christopher Erickson, the new U.S. Department of Transportation Director of PNT and Spectrum Management, succeeding longtime and widely respected GPS leader Karen Van Dyke. Erickson offered a sweeping overview of the current state of GPS, underscoring the extent to which U.S. positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) policy now involves a broad cross-section of government.

“It is very much a whole-of-government effort,” Erickson said. “NASA is addressing navigation beyond GEO and into the cislunar domain, developing plans for how position, navigation and timing will be provided in those environments. At the Department of Transportation, my office works across all transportation modes, including rail, highways and maritime, while the Federal Aviation Administration, of course, plays a central role in aviation. The Department of State is responsible for many of our international engagements with other global navigation satellite system providers, and the GPS system itself resides within the Department of Defense.”

It was the kind of summary that reminded the audience that GPS is no longer merely a satellite constellation, if indeed it ever was. It is a governance framework, a modernization program, a diplomatic instrument, a military capability, a civil utility and, increasingly, a resilience problem set. Erickson’s remarks made clear that no single office can now speak for the totality of the U.S. effort in PNT resilience. 

His overview continued in similar depth, and audience members received a concise but revealing tour of how GPS modernization, resilience planning and civil policy are being approached in Washington. Erickson was sharp, direct and notably comfortable speaking without presentation slides.

Off the Cuff

“One reason I did not feel it was essential to bring slides,” Erickson said, “is that GPS is, by design, a very deliberate and carefully managed system. If you have seen a GPS update in the last 18 months, you have likely seen many of the core elements already. That reflects our emphasis on stability, integrity and accuracy. We are cautious about implementing changes until we fully understand their implications.”

That observation may have drawn a few smiles, but it also underscored something important about GPS modernization: Progress in this domain is rarely theatrical. It is measured, highly scrutinized and often slower than outside observers would prefer. Yet, that caution is not accidental. It is built into the culture of a system on which aviation, defense, mapping, timing and countless commercial applications depend.

He then turned to the future of the constellation and the question of what comes after GPS IIIF.

“There are several avenues under consideration,” Erickson said. “We conducted a study known as R-GPS, or Resilient GPS, to examine how we might evolve the system while taking advantage of new capabilities and new thinking. That included looking at smaller satellites, shorter design lives, opportunities for multi-manifest launch, and ways to make the overall architecture less of a large, slow-moving enterprise and more agile, flexible and responsive, while preserving the accuracy and integrity on which users depend.”

He suggested a future architecture may not require every satellite to carry the same full set of functions.

“We also examined whether every satellite in a future architecture would need to carry the same full suite of capabilities,” he said. “If not, how might we distribute functions more effectively? How could space-based assets be used to complement one another? And how should such capabilities be distributed across orbit to deliver the most resilient and effective system?”

GPS may be deliberate in its evolution, but the strategic thinking around it is anything but static.

“We concluded that our primary focus should remain on MEO,” Erickson said. “At the same time, we launched the NTS-3 experiment, the first end-to-end navigation satellite experiment conducted by the United States in several decades. NTS-3 is exploring reprogrammability, ground responsiveness, user equipment implications, additional authorized signals, commercially relevant encryption approaches, and broader options for resilience. We hope to have initial results from that work later this year.”

Erickson also pointed to the Department of Transportation’s evaluation of complementary PNT technologies, an area of growing interest as governments seek to reduce overdependence on any single source of timing and navigation.

“We are close to releasing our first report covering approximately seven complementary PNT technologies,” he said, “and we are preparing to begin evaluating an additional group. In these efforts, we are procuring services from the companies involved and then assessing the technologies rigorously, from multiple operational and technical perspectives. The goal is to identify what these systems can do, where they perform well and where they may be appropriate within a broader PNT architecture.”

That is one of the most closely watched areas in U.S. policy today. The question is no longer whether alternatives or complements to GNSS exist. It is how they should be tested, how they should be compared and, most important, where they fit in a real operational framework. Erickson’s description suggested a government trying to move beyond abstract interest toward structured evaluation.

Another area gaining importance is PNT situational awareness.

“We have also begun a cross-government effort to create a shared data library,” Erickson said. “We already have several visualization tools and are continuing to expand and refine them. At the same time, we are engaging with international partners to share data and explore how to produce more comprehensive situational awareness products that can help inform decision-making as the interference environment evolves.”

Fischer then took the discussion in a broader direction, asking Erickson how the United States is thinking about the balance between maintaining an open global GNSS service and addressing the very real security concerns now moving to the top of the European agenda.

“If you are providing an open service,” Erickson said, “there are limits to what can be delivered solely by the service provider, and a significant portion of resilience necessarily resides with users and user equipment. That said, one important area I did not touch on earlier is authentication. It was not built into the civil service at the outset, largely because the scope of GPS’s eventual adoption was not fully anticipated. Today, however, we are working on out-of-band civil signal authentication that will be available to receivers with internet connectivity, and we are also advancing modernized civil authentication. Those efforts are proceeding in coordination with the U.S. Space Force as requirements are finalized and implementation moves forward.”

Forward with L5, but When?

The L5 signal is one of the most important modernization steps in GPS. More than simply an additional frequency, it represents a major advance in robustness, reliability and performance for safety-critical and precision applications. For aviation, surveying and other demanding user communities, L5 promises higher transmitted power, a stronger signal structure and characteristics specifically aligned with safety-of-life applications. First transmitted in 2005, however, it still has not been declared fully available for open-service users.

“We certainly have enough satellites on orbit transmitting L5 to support an initial capability,” Erickson said in response to an audience question. “By the time the tenth GPS III satellite is in the constellation, we expect to have 21. However, that is not the entire picture. The U.S. government has faced considerable pressure to declare the signal healthy, including under conditional approaches. But because L5 occupies a safety-of-life band, and because of what that means for our obligations with respect to integrity, we are not yet fully comfortable with the state of the overall enterprise.”

He made clear that the issue is tied not just to space assets, but to the ground segment and broader operational readiness.

“It is closely tied to the development of the ground system,” he said. “While I cannot provide a date today, we are continually reevaluating the situation and working toward bringing L5 forward as soon as we can do so responsibly.”

That answer led naturally to the larger issue of resilient PNT and the current U.S. posture.

“But stepping back to R-GPS,” Fischer asked, “what did the effort clarify, and how is the United States now thinking about resilient PNT more broadly?”

“That is an important question,” Erickson replied. “What you are seeing from the United States is an exploration of the boundary between what government should appropriately provide as foundational infrastructure and where the commercial sector should take the lead. The current administration has a strong interest in leveraging commercial capability wherever that is practical and effective.”

The question has resonance beyond the United States. When the European Union announced Galileo’s free High Accuracy Service, some commercial correction-service providers raised concerns that a government-backed free offering might disrupt existing markets. Ultimately, the market adapted, but the debate over where public provision should end and commercial opportunity should begin remains an active one.

“We are still working to define that appropriate boundary,” Erickson said, “what government should provide and what commercial industry is best positioned to provide in the context of resilient position, navigation and timing. I expect that this will eventually lead to a restructuring of broader PNT strategy. At present, however, we are in a data-collection and evaluation phase. NTS-3 is part of that. Our complementary PNT assessment effort is part of that as well. We are gathering the information needed to shape a coherent U.S. approach to resilient PNT moving forward, and I think we will see that picture come into much sharper focus over the next one to two years.”

The Timing’s Right

Timing, the “T” in PNT, is often overshadowed by navigation and positioning. Yet, it underpins telecom networks, power grids, financial systems and the digital infrastructure of modern life. Without precise timing, positioning solutions degrade, communications networks fall out of sync and critical infrastructure can quickly become unreliable. In Munich, timing was not overlooked.

Dana Goward, president of the Virginia-based Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, moderated a special Summit session on resilient time provision as a foundation of modern infrastructure. A longtime friend and collaborator of Inside GNSS, Goward is a familiar and respected figure in the transatlantic PNT community.

We caught up with him between sessions, where he explained the strategic framework he and others have been advancing.

“Timing is, and historically has been, a sovereign responsibility in support of both economic strength and national security,” Goward said. “At the RNT Foundation, and in some respects at the U.S. Department of Transportation as well, we have described a minimum resilient PNT architecture that includes what we call the resilience triad: signals from space, signals from terrestrial broadcast systems, and terrestrial fiber-based timing.”

The panel reflected that framework. Participants included Per Olof Hedekvist of Sweden’s RISE Research Institutes, an advocate for terrestrial backup systems such as eLoran; Stefan Baumann of IABG, who is active in resilient PNT testing, evaluation and system integration; Lisa Wörner of DLR, whose work includes resilient timing research, GNSS interference mitigation and alternative timing sources; and Tyler Reid, co-founder and CTO of Xona Space Systems.

Goward’s broader mission is to help policymakers understand the problem is solvable—and the tools to address it are already available.

“We have the technology, and in most cases it is not prohibitively expensive,” he said. “In many instances, elements of the solution are already in operation. What is needed is to bring them together coherently. At that point, the issue becomes one of leadership and governance.”

It is a message he has repeated often, and deliberately.

“We like to think of our work not as repetitive,” he said, “but as consistent. Staying on message matters.”

Storming Back

Another familiar and respected presence at the Munich Summit was Harold “Stormy” Martin, Director of the U.S. National Coordination Office for Space-Based PNT. As always, he offered pointed observations on the state of policy and implementation in the United States.

“We are in a relatively strong position in the sense that the policy guidance is clear,” Martin said. “Space Policy Directive-7, which was issued at the end of President Trump’s first term, speaks directly to resilience. Executive Order 13905 likewise calls on departments and agencies to strengthen resilience. So, the direction from the top-level policy framework is well established.”

By any measure, GPS remains one of the most consequential—and in some ways unexpected—success stories in modern infrastructure.

“There was never a plan for GPS to become the sole source of timing and navigation for federal departments or for critical infrastructure,” Martin said. “That does not appear in any White House policy document. Rather, we are in some respects dealing with the consequences of GPS’s extraordinary success. GPS and other GNSS services have been reliable, widely available and increasingly inexpensive to use. Receiver costs have fallen dramatically, and that has made GNSS the simplest choice for many budget-conscious decision-makers. Over time, alternative systems were reduced or eliminated, and some sectors now find themselves reliant on GNSS as their only remaining source of navigation and timing.”

That reality, he said, has created a strategic vulnerability that policymakers are now trying to address.

“It is an excellent system, and it has served us extremely well,” Martin said. “But every system has vulnerabilities. The signal originates roughly 12,000 miles away in space. It can be jammed. It can be spoofed. Those are not hypothetical issues.”

Current policy, he noted, places the emphasis on resilience, but implementation is inseparable from budget realities.

“Our policies are clear in telling organizations that they need to become more resilient,” Martin said. “The challenge, of course, is that these efforts remain subject to appropriations, and funding can be difficult to secure. Part of what we are trying to do is educate new decision-makers and create incentives for investment. You can already see some early steps in that direction. The FCC has issued a Notice of Inquiry on complementary PNT. That is part of building the record around what can be done to encourage industry to provide complementary PNT technologies that, together with GPS, can support a resilient and secure national PNT system of systems.”

How urgent is the issue? Martin suggested that current events are making the case more effectively than any abstract policy argument could.

“There is an old saying in Washington: Never let a good crisis go to waste,” Martin said. “If you look at the levels of jamming associated with conflicts in the Red Sea, in the Russia-Ukraine war and elsewhere, it becomes much easier to show leaders that this is not a theoretical concern. The objective is to strengthen our systems before that kind of disruption has domestic consequences.”

Getting Answers

A central part of the federal government’s effort to understand GPS vulnerability and evaluate alternatives has been the work conducted through the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center. The so-called Volpe study has examined weaknesses in GPS-dependent operations while assessing candidate backup and complementary PNT technologies.

“Testing is essential,” Martin said. “And when we talk about mature technology, that includes practical readiness. One benchmark is whether a provider can bring equipment to a test site within six months. That is the kind of criterion that helps distinguish conceptual promise from deployable capability.”

The testing program is ongoing, and some reports are expected soon.

“The good news is that this is an achievable problem set,” Martin said. “We have policy guidance. We have demonstrated that credible technologies exist. The next step is determining how to invest. I have been making that case for 10 years, and I am more encouraged now than I have been in a long time.”

That closing note of cautious optimism matched the mood in Munich. The technical problems remain substantial. The policy questions are far from fully resolved. The funding picture is still uncertain. Yet, there is now a stronger shared vocabulary around resilience, a clearer understanding of the stakes and, perhaps most important, less hesitation about acknowledging that dependence on GNSS alone is no longer sufficient.

As temperatures outside dropped and snow began to fall over the Bavarian capital, the atmosphere inside the Summit remained warm and energetic, animated in no small part by speakers such as Erickson and Martin, and by the wider community now working to define what a resilient PNT future should look like. The concerns are real, the systems are under pressure and the architecture of the next phase is still being worked out. But in Munich, the conversation felt notably more mature than it did even a few years ago.

That, in itself, was one of the stronger signals to come out of the Summit.

And when this issue of Inside GNSS is presented at the Assured PNT Summit in Washington on April 7, it is likely that many of the same themes will be waiting there: resilience, authentication, complementary systems, timing assurance and the growing recognition that PNT must now be treated not simply as a technical service, but as strategic infrastructure. 

Munich did not resolve those questions. But it did provide a clear and timely snapshot of how seriously they are now being taken on both sides of the Atlantic. 

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Speaking the day after Xona announced its oversubscribed $170 million Series C, Reid did not dwell on venture optics. He talked instead about signal power, indoor penetration, interoperability and deployment. That matters, because for years the case for low Earth orbit PNT has been technically compelling but not yet commercially proven at scale. Xona’s new raise suggests that may be changing, and Reid’s comments in Munich made clear that the company wants the market to understand this moment not as another capital event, but as the transition from concept to operational proof.

The Burlingame, California-based company says the round was led by Mohari Ventures Natural Capital and included participation from Craft Ventures, ICONIQ, Woven Capital, NGP Capital, Samsung Next and Hexagon. The money, Xona says, will fund both constellation deployment and manufacturing scale-up at its new factory in Burlingame. On its own, that is a significant financing story. But heard against the backdrop of Munich, the announcement sounded less like a startup celebrating a raise and more like a company trying to establish that resilient positioning, navigation and timing is finally being recognized as an infrastructure market rather than an engineering niche.

That is the larger significance of the round. Xona is arguing that the next era of navigation will not be built simply by modernizing legacy GNSS at the margins. It will come from a new PNT architecture—commercially manufactured, rapidly deployed and designed from the outset for stronger signals, authentication and integration with today’s installed receiver base.

At the center of that vision is Pulsar, Xona’s LEO PNT system. In its product materials, the company describes Pulsar as a backward-compatible service that broadcasts alongside existing GNSS signals, with compatibility across receivers using L1 or L5 and, in many cases, an upgrade path through firmware rather than entirely new hardware. Xona says Pulsar’s X1 and X5 signals are intended to deliver 2 cm by 4 cm positioning accuracy, less than 10 nanoseconds of timing, and received power up to 100 times stronger than GPS L1 C/A.

In Munich, Reid gave that headline claim a more grounded form. “We typically are seeing at that apex about 20 dB difference compared to us versus GNSS,” he said. “So that 20 dB is 100 times stronger signal.” This statement reinforces one of the most important aspects of Xona’s thesis: stronger signals are not just about better nominal performance. They are about resilience, penetration and utility in places where conventional GNSS becomes fragile.

Reid pushed that point further when he described what Xona has already been seeing from its early on-orbit testing. “We’ve shown that we can penetrate indoors and you can get as good as a three-meter level position with just the one satellite in space,” he said. Even allowing for the caveats he included—that this reflects a stationary user and observations from multiple looks during a satellite pass—the implication is noteworthy. 

That compatibility claim remains central to the company’s overall strategy. Alternative PNT concepts often falter not because the performance case is weak, but because the transition cost is too high. Xona is trying to remove that barrier by presenting LEO PNT not as a replacement that forces the market to start over, but as an adjacent upgrade that works with the GNSS ecosystem already in the field. The company says more than a dozen commercial receiver partners are already tracking Pulsar signals, with testing underway in sectors including critical infrastructure, construction, agriculture and IoT.

Here again, Reid’s Munich comments help sharpen the point. Speaking in response to a question about time scales and interoperability, he said, “We have that defined in our ICD to support multiple timescale offsets so that these systems do become interoperable.” That is an important detail. It suggests that Xona understands one of the fundamental barriers to adoption: the market does not want an isolated new layer. It wants a service that can integrate with existing timing references, existing receivers and existing workflows without imposing a wholesale reset on infrastructure operators and equipment makers.

The timing of the funding announcement also gives it added weight. In the release, Xona explicitly ties its case to the growing fragility of GNSS-dependent infrastructure, citing interference in the Strait of Hormuz, the vulnerability of GPS to jamming and spoofing, and the difficulty governments have had in adding resilience through conventional acquisition cycles. The company points as well to slow and over-budget modernization efforts in the United States. That framing is, of course, self-interested. But it also aligns with a broader shift in the PNT community: resilience is no longer a secondary requirement. It is increasingly becoming the requirement that defines system value.

Xona’s answer is scale. The company says its Burlingame facility will support deployment of the full approximately 300-satellite Pulsar constellation “in just a few years,” a pace it contrasts with traditional aerospace contracting. Xona is selling a model in which navigation infrastructure is built more like a modern commercial platform than a classic sovereign space program.

That shift may ultimately be the most consequential part of the story. For decades, GNSS has been defined by exquisite but slow-moving national systems, where capability improvements arrive over long timelines and resiliency upgrades can take years to materialize. Xona is making the opposite argument: that navigation can be manufactured, iterated and replenished at commercial speed. In the release, the company says its model could produce more navigation satellites per week at full production than the United States currently produces in a year. 

Reid’s comments in Munich reinforced that execution message. “We announced yesterday that we’re fully funded to deploy the first tranche of satellites to get the first commercial service,” he said. In a sector that has seen no shortage of elegant architecture slides, that line may be as important as any performance metric. It moves the conversation from theoretical constellation economics toward a near-term operating plan. Reid added that Xona will launch six satellites this year, followed by another dozen or more next year, with an initial service phase aimed in part at industrial time transfer. Those details make the financing round feel consequential in a way that venture announcements often do not. The capital is not being raised to continue talking about the future of PNT. It is being raised to start building that future at scale.

The company is also trying to show that this is not a U.S.-only play. Alongside the Burlingame buildout, Xona says it is expanding in Montreal and growing a London office, while partnerships with Furuno and Topcon are meant to extend the company’s reach into timing, industrial and international markets. That global framing is important. The demand for resilient timing and positioning is not limited to defense or autonomous vehicles. It increasingly reaches into telecom, power systems, industrial automation and any sector where precise synchronization and trusted location have become operational dependencies.

The Furuno partnership is particularly revealing because it highlights timing as an early commercial beachhead. In that announcement, Xona says the collaboration will focus on incorporating Pulsar capabilities into Furuno’s existing product domains with an initial emphasis on industrial timing. Xona argues that stronger signals and nanosecond-level precision can be brought into systems already trusted today, suggesting that timing may emerge as one of the first markets where LEO PNT proves immediate value before full navigation-scale deployment is complete.

Even so, this round feels like more than another venture milestone. Seen from Munich, and heard through Reid’s remarks on stronger signals, indoor penetration, interoperability and deployment readiness, it marks a moment when the LEO PNT conversation appears to be shifting from architecture diagrams and simulation arguments toward factories, launches and market timing. For a field that has spent years talking about vulnerability, backup and modernization, that is a meaningful change. Xona’s bet—and now its investors’ bet—is that the future of PNT will belong not simply to the strongest legacy signal, but to the systems that can deliver precision, trust and resilience at the speed the modern world now expects.

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The AsteRx EB is aimed at industrial robots, port logistics, marine platforms, and scalable automation systems — markets where accuracy requirements are demanding but where the volume economics of a high-end OEM module may not be practical. The IP67-rated housing protects against weather and dust, and the compact enclosure is designed to reduce installation time and simplify integration.

On the positioning side, the receiver incorporates Septentrio’s GNSS+ algorithms for performance in environments that challenge standard GNSS — foliage, urban multipath, proximity to interference sources. In a dual-antenna configuration, it delivers sub-degree heading alongside RTK-level positioning, covering applications that require both location and orientation. The AIM+ anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technology is built in, addressing the growing priority of interference resilience in industrial and autonomous systems.

“AsteRx EB is an ideal boxed receiver for customers who need reliable, resilient, and highly accurate positioning in a compact form factor and at a price point that makes rapid scale-up possible,” said Danilo Sabbatini, Product Manager at Septentrio.

The AsteRx EB slots into Septentrio’s enclosed receiver lineup between the mosaic-go evaluation platform and the AsteRx RB3, which is positioned for applications requiring the highest level of mechanical and environmental protection. Septentrio notes the EB can also serve as an evaluation platform for integrators assessing its positioning technology before committing to a production architecture.

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The i700 draws on the sensor architecture and electronics of Honeywell’s HG3900 IMU, which the company introduced in June 2025 as a next-generation MEMS-based tactical-grade unit. The HGuide version trades the HG3900’s broader dynamic range for a constrained acceleration and spin-rate envelope optimized for longer-range navigation in GNSS-denied and GNSS-challenged environments — a profile suited to UAS, unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, and stabilized payloads operating without reliable satellite positioning.

The no-license-required classification is the product’s primary commercial differentiator. Export-controlled inertial systems require government authorization that adds time and complexity to integration programs, particularly for international customers and commercial developers working across multiple markets. By limiting the i700’s performance envelope to remain below export control thresholds, Honeywell is positioning it as a drop-in option for integrators who need near-navigation-grade inertial performance without the procurement friction of a controlled part.

“The HGuide i700 offers strong GNSS-denied performance by limiting maximum acceleration and spin rates in a license-free package that simplifies the complexity of system development while preserving reliability,” said Matt Picchetti, vice president and general manager, Navigation and Sensors, Honeywell Aerospace.

The i700 joins the HGuide i300 and i400 in Honeywell’s no-license inertial product line, extending the suite’s ceiling toward navigation-grade performance. Honeywell describes the unit as suited to mobile mapping and surveying systems, robotics and industrial automation, and long-duration unmanned ground and surface platforms in addition to aerial applications.

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For many in the PNT community, the event evoked memories of a much longer, 44-hour disruption in that area in 2022.

For two minutes, between 11:47 and 11:49 local time on March 19, 12 aircraft reported false positions as a result of the interference. The incident was reported on the social media site LinkedIn. Both Benoit Figuet of SKAI Data Services, which operates the GPSwise advisory service, and Jeremy Bennington from Spirent, which offers the Watchman service, posted about the event.

Bennington was less specific about the time of the event but reported that it was to the west of DFW and had varying impacts on aircraft.

“Over the past 24 hours, we observed a GPS spoofing event to the west of DFW impacting multiple flights.” He cited eight flights from four airlines and commented that one had “brief low-integrity indications before and after,” another “lost GPS for the remainder of the flight,” and a third “experienced a loss of ADS-B without clear spoofing.”

“What stands out is the geographic consistency—almost all affected aircraft were on the west side of DFW, with only one instance on the east side,” he said.

“Even more interesting: Most aircraft maintained ‘good’ integrity indications. In more established interference zones, we often see integrity degradation before and after spoofing events. That wasn’t consistently the case here, which could make these events more difficult for flight crews to recognize and manage in real time.”

Bennington also discussed the impact to aviation safety.

“This is particularly concerning given the phase of flight. Interference during approach and departure introduces real safety risks, including the potential for false eGPWS alerts.”

Stanford University GPS experts Todd Walter, Zixi Liu and Sherman Lo observed that the “spoof to” location was near the center of effect, which had a greater than 50-mile radius. This “…also appears to be near Fort Wolters Range Control, a former Army base,” Walter said. He commented that Fort Wolters had been the site of DHS counter-UAS testing in the past. 

Mitch Narins, president of Strategic Synergies and a former Chief Systems Engineer for Navigation at the FAA, said no advisories for exercises or tests had been posted for the day the spoofing took place.

This has led some to speculate the incident was the result of an accidental or unannounced use of a system that interferes with GPS reception as a way to deter or disable drones.

Department of Transportation (DOT) officials have been upgrading their ability to respond to such events since the 2022 incident. In this case, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was immediately alerted by aviation users and the department quickly responded to ensure the problem source was identified and terminated.

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VectorNav Technologies today announced 90G and 250G accelerometer and 4000°/sec gyroscope ranges across its Tactical Series inertial measurement unit (IMU) and inertial navigation system (INS) product line. The enhancement directly addresses urgent requirements from defense contractors and platform developers operating in high-G mission profiles.

Defense modernization priorities are accelerating procurements of interceptors, missiles, and hypersonic platforms that must operate through launch, interception, and aggressive maneuvering—often in environments where GPS is denied or degraded. In these conditions, navigation performance depends on the IMU’s ability to maintain solution integrity without saturating. The extended-range Tactical Series is designed to meet that requirement, providing the core inertial measurements that enable resilient position, navigation, and timing (PNT) solutions to operate through mission-critical flight phases where conventional sensors fail.

“The demand signal from our customers has been unmistakable,” said Jakub Maslikowski, VP of Business Development. “As platforms become faster, more maneuverable, and face increasingly sophisticated threats, high-performance inertial navigation solutions are needed at scale to meet the evolving demand. With nearly 20 years supporting these mission profiles, we know these applications—and the extended-range gyro and accelerometer will enable faster integration and more rapid fielding of reliable systems.”

–  High-speed interceptor platforms

–  Rapid-response strike systems

–  Hypersonic and advanced maneuvering vehicles

–  Counter-UAS and air defense systems

The extended-range accelerometer and gyroscope are available across the full VN-110 IMU and VN-210 / VN-310 INS product family, supporting applications including:

Next-generation precision guidanceThe extended-range configurations are drop-in compatible with existing platforms—no changes to form, fit, or function—enabling immediate upgrades without redesign.VectorNav systems are designed, manufactured, and tested at the company’s AS9100-certified Dallas facility, where the company currently produces tens of thousands of units annually. As demand for resilient PNT continues to accelerate globally, VectorNav is expanding production capacity in 2026 with a new 100,000 sq. ft. facility to support high-volume programs and R&D efforts.Engineering units of the enhanced Tactical Series are available now for immediate test and evaluation. For technical specifications, integration support, or procurement information, contact sa***@*******av.com or visit vectornav.com.

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The U.S. Space Force has reassigned the launch of the final GPS III satellite to SpaceX, citing the need to maintain delivery timelines for critical positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) capability while United Launch Alliance (ULA) investigates issues with its Vulcan rocket.

According to a statement from Space Systems Command, the GPS III-8 mission—carrying Space Vehicle 10 (SV-10), the final satellite in the GPS Block III series—will now launch aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 no earlier than late April 2026. 

The mission had previously been manifested on ULA’s Vulcan Centaur.

Timeline pressure drives launch reassignment

The decision reflects a continued emphasis by the Space Force on assured and timely delivery of modernized GPS capability, particularly as the Block III series approaches completion. GPS III satellites introduce improved accuracy, anti-jam performance through M-code, and enhanced signal integrity for both military and civil users. 

Officials framed the move as part of a broader “launch provider exchange” strategy within the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, leveraging the fact that GPS III spacecraft are certified to fly on multiple vehicles. 

This flexibility has been exercised repeatedly over the past two years. Earlier GPS III missions—including SV-09, launched in January 2026—were also shifted from Vulcan to Falcon 9 to maintain schedule continuity. 

Vulcan anomaly under review, not a program reset

The reassignment follows ongoing investigation into anomalies involving Vulcan’s solid rocket boosters, observed during recent flights. While those missions achieved orbit and met primary objectives, the Space Force elected to pause Vulcan’s use for national security launches pending further analysis. 

Importantly, the move does not signal a broader departure from ULA within the NSSL architecture. As part of the exchange, Vulcan is now slated to support the USSF-70 mission, currently projected for 2028. 

ULA remains a core provider in the dual-lane launch strategy, with dozens of missions still assigned over the coming years.

Closing out the GPS III baseline

The SV-10 launch will complete the initial GPS III tranche, a 10-satellite modernization effort led by Lockheed Martin. 

With nine spacecraft already on orbit—including the most recent SV-09 launched earlier this year—the final mission represents a transition point toward the next-generation GPS IIIF series, which is expected to introduce further enhancements in regional military protection and search-and-rescue payloads.

For the Space Force, the immediate priority remains clear: maintaining continuity of PNT services and accelerating deployment timelines where possible.

That approach has increasingly relied on responsive launch practices and provider interchangeability—an operational model demonstrated across multiple recent GPS III missions and now extended to the program’s final satellite.

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The company said the funding will support expansion of its portfolio of navigation technologies that integrate inertial sensors, AI-driven perception systems and sensor-fusion software to maintain accurate positioning in GNSS-denied environments. The technologies are intended for applications across aerospace, defense, robotics and maritime operations.

Focus on GNSS-Resilient Navigation

Advanced Navigation’s core technology stack centers on high-performance inertial navigation systems (INS) combined with advanced sensor fusion algorithms. These systems use data from inertial measurement units (IMUs), computer vision, acoustic sensors and other onboard inputs to estimate position and orientation when satellite navigation signals cannot be relied upon.

Such capabilities are increasingly important as GNSS disruption—whether through interference, jamming or spoofing—has become more common in both civilian and defense operating environments.

Chris Shaw, co-founder and CEO of Advanced Navigation, said the company’s goal is to enable autonomous systems to maintain reliable navigation even in complex operating conditions.

“Our mission is to deliver navigation and autonomy technologies that allow systems to operate reliably across sea, land, air and space,” Shaw said in a statement.

Inertial navigation systems play a central role in these architectures. While INS solutions can maintain navigation continuity without external signals, they accumulate error over time due to sensor drift. Modern navigation stacks therefore rely on sensor fusion techniques that combine inertial measurements with other inputs—such as visual landmarks, lidar data or acoustic signals—to correct drift and maintain accuracy.

Expanding the Alternative PNT Ecosystem

Demand for complementary PNT technologies has grown rapidly as governments and industry seek alternatives to exclusive reliance on satellite navigation. Recent disruptions in regions such as the Black Sea, Eastern Europe and the Middle East have highlighted the operational risks posed by GNSS interference.

Companies developing resilient navigation architectures are increasingly integrating multiple sensing modalities—including visual navigation, signals of opportunity and advanced inertial systems—to provide robust positioning capability when satellite signals are unavailable.

Advanced Navigation has focused on combining high-performance hardware with artificial intelligence-based perception systems. These technologies are intended to support autonomous platforms operating in complex environments such as urban areas, indoor facilities, underground infrastructure and subsea environments.

Applications Across Autonomous Systems

The company’s navigation technologies are used across a range of autonomous platforms including unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, ground robots and maritime vessels. These platforms require reliable navigation even when operating in environments where GNSS reception is blocked or intentionally disrupted.

Advanced Navigation said the new funding will allow the company to accelerate development and global deployment of its navigation technologies while expanding manufacturing capacity.

As autonomous systems become more widely deployed across commercial and defense sectors, resilient navigation architectures that integrate inertial sensing, perception and AI-driven sensor fusion are expected to play a central role in next-generation PNT systems.

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The receivers were delivered under the Modernized GPS User Equipment (MGUE) Increment 1 program, a Department of Defense initiative designed to replace legacy GPS receivers with systems capable of accessing encrypted M-Code signals and operating in contested electromagnetic environments. 

The milestone reflects the large-scale fielding of M-Code-enabled PNT hardware across multiple operational domains, including air, land and maritime platforms.

Scaling Secure Military PNT

M-Code is the latest generation of encrypted military GPS signals designed to improve resistance to jamming, spoofing and other forms of interference. The signal is intended to provide more robust navigation and timing services for military users as electronic warfare and GPS denial capabilities proliferate. 

Under the MGUE program, the Department of Defense is transitioning platforms across the joint force to receivers capable of processing M-Code signals transmitted by modernized GPS satellites.

L3Harris stated that the delivery milestone reflects the growing deployment of secure PNT hardware as operations become more distributed and reliant on reliable navigation and timing data. The company has been involved in GPS modernization efforts for more than four decades, supplying receivers and related technologies for defense platforms and weapons systems. 

The 100,000-unit threshold highlights the scale at which M-Code receivers are now being integrated into operational systems across U.S. and allied forces.

Supporting the MGUE Transition

MGUE Increment 1 focuses on integrating M-Code receivers into existing military platforms, including aircraft, ground vehicles and precision-guided systems.

The transition is part of a broader GPS modernization architecture that includes new satellite generations, upgraded control systems and updated user equipment capable of securely receiving the modernized signals.

Within this architecture, receiver modules such as L3Harris’ TruTrak-M Type II are designed to meet MGUE technical requirements while addressing size, weight, power and cost constraints associated with integration into operational platforms. 

Improving receiver performance and resilience is considered critical as adversaries increasingly deploy electronic warfare capabilities designed to disrupt satellite navigation signals.

Next Phase of GPS Receiver Development

L3Harris said it is continuing development efforts for MGUE Increment 2, which aims to further improve receiver performance and integration flexibility.

The next phase of the program includes development of a new M-Code-capable application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and next-generation receiver modules intended to reduce size, weight and power requirements while maintaining security and performance. 

These advances are expected to enable broader integration of secure GPS capability across additional platforms and mission systems.

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