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WEBINAR AND VIRTUAL WORKSHOP: ON THE ROAD TO AUTONOMY



Wednesday, Dec 12, 2018

10 a.m. PST • Noon CST • 1 p.m. EST

6 p.m. BST • 7 p.m. CEST



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WELCOME TO

On the Road to Autonomy



Demoz Gebre-Egziabher
Professor
Aerospace Engineering and
Mechanics
University of Minnesota



Terry Lamprecht
Director of Products
AutonomouStuff



Lance de Groot
Senior Team Lead
Geomatics - Safety Critical
Systems
NovAtel



Samer Khanafseh
Research Assist. Professor
Manager
Illinois Institute of Tech.
TruNav LLC

Co-Moderator: Lori Dearman, Executive Webinar Producer

Who's In the Audience?

A diverse audience of over 480 professionals registered from 52 countries, representing the following industries:

24% GNSS equipment manufacturer


16% System Integrator

14% Professional User

11% Product/Application Designer

9% Government

26% Other





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Welcome from *Inside Unmanned Systems*



Richard Fischer
Publisher
Inside GNSS
Inside Unmanned Systems

A word from the sponsor



Natasha Wong Ken
Product Manager
Safety Critical Systems
NovAtel, part of Hexagon's
Positioning Intelligence
Division



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Poll #1

How critical do you think the GNSS component is compared to other autonomous driving sensors (i.e. LiDAR, Radar, Camera, etc...)?


- A. Most Important*
- B. Very Important*
- C. Somewhat Important*
- D. Not Important at All*

Today's Development Platforms




Terry Lamprecht
Director of Products and New Technologies
AutonomouStuff


Today's Development Platforms




STAGES OF AUTONOMY



Current ADAS Solutions



Compute Solutions



- Middleware
 - ROS
 - Others
- Industrial vs embedded computing

Cons:

- Power requirements
- Heat dissipation
- Robustness



Poll #2

What do you think the biggest barrier is to widespread production of autonomous vehicles? (select your top two)

- a) Public Safety*
- b) Cost*
- c) Regulation*
- d) Infrastructure*
- e) Technology Limitations*

RADAR

Pros:


- Automotive production volumes
- Robust design
- Reliable detection

Cons:

- Current bandwidth/resolution



LiDAR




Pros:

- High resolution
- Fast update rate


Cons:

- Price
- Environmental obscuration
- Mechanical designs
- Solid state design delays

LiDAR Object Processing



Vision



Pros:

- Good for lane detection
- Preferred method of classification

Cons:

- Raw images produce huge amounts of data
- Needs quality lane markings
- Needs proper illumination



Vision



Thermal Vision Advantages:

- Nighttime driving
- Better visibility during rain, fog, smoke and dust


Parallel/Centralized Processing



Pros:

- Enables easier sensor fusion
- Lower cost at high volumes
- Application specific processing

Ultrasonic



Pros:

- Low cost
- Reliable/robust sensing

Cons:

- Extremely short range

Today's GNSS Ground Truth Systems

Pros:

- Extremely accurate
- Tightly coupled systems
Provide adequate position in a variety of difficult scenarios

Cons:

- High cost
- Complex systems





Poll #3

What level of positioning accuracy do you think autonomous driving requires?


- A. 0 – 10 cm*
- B. 10 – 50 cm*
- C. 50 cm – 1 Meter*
- D. >1 Meter*

Precise Positioning for Automotive with Mass Market GNSS Chipsets



Lance de Groot
Senior Team Lead, Geomatics – Safety Critical Systems
NovAtel, part of Hexagon's Positioning Intelligence
Division

- Production GNSS in automotive today
 - L1 only pseudorange solution
 - Several metres of error
- Emerging applications in automotive require increased performance
 - V2V $\rightarrow 1.5 \text{ m } 1\sigma^1$
 - AD/ADAS $\rightarrow < 1.0 \text{ m}$
- How to get there?
 - Multi-frequency mass-market chipsets recently announced
 - High precision carrier phase positioning algorithms





¹NHTSA V2V Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (2127-AL55)




- RTK (including Network RTK)
 - Works by differencing measurements between rover and base to remove errors
 - Regional solution
 - Requires ~20-50 km station spacing
- PPP
 - Works by providing corrections for all error sources
 - Global solution, with regional atmospheric corrections
 - Regional requires ~100-300 km station spacing
- Our approach for automotive is PPP
 - One way data transfer
 - Less infrastructure
 - Globally consistent solution a benefit for implementation, safety

	RTK	PPP
Orbit	✓ and ✗	✓
Antenna phase centre offset	✓	✓
Antenna phase centre variations	✓	✓
Antenna phase wind-up	✗	✓
Clock corrections	✗	✓
Group delay differential	✗	✓
Relativity term	✗	✓
Ionospheric delay	✗	✓
Tropospheric delay	✓	✓

- We tested four current mass market chipsets



Same
manufacturer



*L5 not supported by
corrections employed


- Some chipsets are not released
- Performance in this study may not reflect final performance

- Measurement noise measured with static zero-baseline double difference test

	Code Phase Standard Deviation (cm)		Carrier Phase Standard Deviation (mm)	
	GPS L1 C/A	GLS L1 CA	GPS L1 C/A	GLS L1
Chipset A	15	29	1.7	2.0
Chipset B	26	52	1.8	2.3
Chipset C	16	33	0.7	2.2
Chipset D	49	57	3.3	4.7
NovAtel OEM7	5	4	0.5	0.6


- Mass-market chips have 3x to 14x code noise compared to a survey grade receiver
- Will impact PPP convergence performance
- Wider correlator spacing is also more susceptible to multipath
- Phase noise also greater; no significant impact expected

- Convergence tested in offline processing with simulated filter resets
- Horizontal 95% convergence performance with TerraStar-C corrections



- ~9 minutes to reach 1m for dual frequency, > 20 minutes for single frequency
- Not acceptable for automotive applications

- TerraStar-X is a future TerraStar service with enhanced convergence performance
- Provides regional ionosphere corrections



- Sub-metre performance now achieved in 30s for most chipsets
- Feasible for automotive



Ask the Experts – Part 1



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
Moderator: Demoz Gebre-Egziabher

PART II

Precise Positioning for Automotive with Mass Market GNSS Chipsets



Lance de Groot
Senior Team Lead, Geomatics – Safety Critical Systems
NovAtel, part of Hexagon's Positioning Intelligence
Division



Truth System



OEM729

+



uIMU

+



GPS-702GGL



Inertial
Explorer

Position accuracy (m) RMS		Velocity Accuracy (m/s) RMS		Attitude Accuracy (degrees) RMS		
Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical	Roll	Pitch	Heading
0.01	0.02	0.010	0.010	0.005	0.005	0.009

- Industrial district north of Calgary airport
- Mix of 1-2 storey warehouses, controlled access freeway







Photo credits: Google Earth, Google Streetview

- On-board SBAS corrected code solution Chipset B vs. PPP solution with TerraStar X corrections and the same measurements



- PPP solution has a 64 - 93% improvement over on-board solution under open sky at 95%



- Horizontal 95% error from 28 cm to 36 cm
- Viable for AD/ADAS applications

- Route spans two primary controlled access freeways in Calgary
- Open sky punctuated by frequent overpasses






Photo credits: Google Earth, Google Streetview



- Horizontal 95% error from 71 cm to 105 cm
- Error is dominated by re-convergence following outages
- Benefits available from integration with IMU or other relative positioning sensors

- Residential neighbourhoods
- Detached houses, condominiums, foliage
- Fewer total GNSS outages than highway, more partial outages








Photo credits: Google Earth, Google Streetview




- Horizontal 95% error from 60 cm to 77 cm
- Steady state error is slightly higher than highway, reflecting worse environment

- Mass-market and automotive grade antennas also expected to have performance tradeoffs
- Smaller elements, ground planes



GPS-702-GG




Automotive Grade Prototype

- More gradual roll-off at low elevation, lower axial ratio

- Static moderate multipath test
- Survey and automotive grade antenna
- Survey grade and mass market chipset



68% horizontal convergence



- Mass-market chipset performance degrades more with automotive grade antenna
- Consistent with wider correlator spacing
- Antenna selection is likely more important with mass-market chips



- Hexagon PI software positioning engine with TerraStar X corrections with mass market chipsets is a viable solution for emerging automotive applications
- Ionospheric corrections are necessary to achieve desired PPP convergence performance
- Antenna selection is important with mass market chipsets



Poll #4

In your opinion, what is the biggest risk to integrity?

- A. *Interference***
- B. *Jamming and Spoofing***
- C. *Data Security***
- D. *GNSS Measurement Errors***

Safety of Autonomous Systems




Samer Khanafseh
Research Assist. Professor / Manager
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- Motivation for autonomous driving has been its safety compared to manned driving
 - Expectation is that autonomous driving will provide lower fatality rate
 - Currently, it is estimated that there is one fatality rate per 100,000,000 miles driven (the statistics has been computed based on several years)
- Does not imply that autonomous systems* can be allowed to be tested, and to count the fatality rate!
 - There should be enough reliability already built-in to the safety of the autonomous driving system
 - Certain design requirements and safety standards with documentation of the system proof-of-safety should be made in front of a certification entity (just like obtaining a driving license)
- It is not enough to demonstrate the system* safety case through testing and demos only
 - Were there enough tests? did the tests cover all scenarios that may arise? were those tests independent? any assumptions used? Can the likelihood of “hazardous” or “catastrophic” events be quantified beforehand?

* System(s) in this context: Guidance, Navigation and Control


- Propose borrowing some concepts from the aviation industry in proving the design safety
- In addition to *accuracy*, system **Integrity** *Continuity* and *Availability* are measures of the system performance:
 - *Integrity risk: a measure of how much can we trust the position provided by the Navigation system*
 - Evaluated system integrity risk and the required value are application dependent:
 - Will a wrong position estimate cause any financial or life risk? Will an interruption to the operation/false-alarm cause any financial or life risk?
 - If so, then we need to provide a level of acceptable likelihood for a wrong position/interruption (stochastically and practically, zero probability is NOT an answer)
 - The required values are usually extracted from system engineering analysis.
 - Threats that are sufficiently likely to occur will require a monitor to mitigate the threat effects.

- Example case of integrity risk I_R and its relation to the protection level PL.
 - The requirements are usually provided as an allowable alert limit AL and integrity risk $I_{R,req}$
$$I_R = P\{|\hat{x}_H - x_H| > AL\} \leq I_{R,req} \text{ (} 10^{-6} \text{ for example)} \Rightarrow PL = P_{|\hat{x}_H - x_H|}^{-1}\{I_{R,req}\}$$
 - Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI) event occurs when the position estimate error $> PL$





- In designing a high integrity system, you need to analyze and address every system node for threats (faults)
 - Construct a fault tree or integrity risk tree
- Each threat or fault needs a threat model: likelihood, magnitude, profile, effect on the measurement, etc.
- Detection, monitoring, error bounding approaches are some of the techniques used for mitigation such that the total integrity risk meets the required value
 - Threat models and mitigation techniques depend on the positioning system (e.g. DGPS, RTK, and PPP)
- For example, for GNSS, we look at every possible fault from signal generation all the way to position estimation.



- Need to design monitors to detect faults and mitigate the threat. In designing a monitor, utilize
 - Threat model
 - Physics of the threat
 - Redundancy (satellite, sensor, etc)
- Need exclusion routines to distinguish the source of fault and exclude it
 - And potentially recovery logic (when the threat is over)
- In **most cases** a design that is tuned to provide high precision or accuracy doesn't necessarily translate to the highest integrity
 - In many cases, it is the opposite, and in others evaluating the integrity risk is quite complex or infeasible
 - E.g. fine tuning the estimator parameters to get high accuracy results of experiments is not considered an advisable approach from an integrity perspective.

- In evaluating the integrity risk for autonomous vehicle applications, it is important to provide conservative error models (overbounding from a stochastic point of view).
- Automotive GNSS systems need to account for MP,
 - Multipath (MP) can occur due to signage, overpasses, trucks, etc.
 - Constraint: can't use other systems to detect changes in MP environment,
 - Need to bound the error under worst case environment.




[1] Khanafseh et al. "GNSS Multipath Error Modeling for Automotive Applications,"
Proc. of the 31st ITM ION GNSS+ 2018, Miami, Florida, Sept. 2018, pp. 1573-1589.

- Mitigation technique: provide GNSS error models under conditions representative of automotive environment,
 - Intended for navigation integrity and continuity risk evaluation.
 - The provided error models cover multifrequency multi-constellation code and carrier phase GNSS measurements under static and dynamic multipath environments
 - We characterized the errors by
 - Mean and standard deviation of a bounding Gaussian distribution
 - The autocorrelation time constant of the measurement errors.

[1] Khanafseh et al. "GNSS Multipath Error Modeling for Automotive Applications," *Proc. of the 31st ITM ION GNSS+ 2018*, Miami, Florida, Sept. 2018, pp. 1573-1589.

- For linear (or linearized) estimators, it has been shown that if the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the actual measurement errors could be overbounded, then the actual estimate error CDF would be overbounded by that of the convolution of the bounding measurement error CDFs.
 - Find a Gaussian CDF with a mean and standard dev. that bounds the empirical distribution
 - With NovAtel's collaboration, we are running data collection campaigns to provide bounding multipath error models.





- **Recall that the integrity of GNSS has been scrutinized like no other sensor/system**
 - It had to go through brutal certification procedures through FAA and ICAO, because it has been proposed as replacement for current systems in terminal, approach and landing phases of civil aircraft
 - But the takeaway is to apply the lessons learned in aviation to autonomous driving field
- **Any other navigation system/sensor has fault modes and sources (Inertial Units, LIDAR, Radar, Vision, etc.)**
 - E.g. search for “fooling computer vision” will show results analogues to GNSS spoofing
- **Where “we” are now:**
 - At Illinois Institute of Tech, we are implementing similar concepts to prove the safety of Hexagon’s design
 - At TruNav, we provide tailored high integrity and accuracy evaluation schemes for different designs

SPAN Land Vehicle Performance Analysis Paper:

[NovAtel's SPAN Land Vehicle Performance Analysis](#)

Hexagon PI Papers:

<https://hexagonpositioning.com/tech-talk/papers>

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Ask the Experts – Part 2



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