Unlike many PNT-related events, the Defense Strategies Institute’s annual Assured PNT (APNT) Summit has always been focused on businesses interested in government direction and policy. Developments in technology are discussed of course, but attendees also hear from government leaders about everything from high-level strategy to, in some cases, the right staff person to contact about contracting opportunities. 

I was privileged to again be the moderator at the most recent summit, which was held, as always, in the Washington, D.C., area. This year, I was struck by the general consensus among attendees on a number of issues spanning technology and policy. 

The event is governed by the Chatham House Rule. So, while I can relate what was said, who said it, their organizations, etcetera must remain, with a few exceptions, confidential. In fairness, though, all of the following points were mentioned by more than one speaker and there seemed to be general agreement among the 200+ attendees.

The theme of the summit was “Developing a Robust Resilient National PNT Architecture for U.S. Dominance.”  

Here are some of my takeaways:

Requirements

While all users and applications have specific PNT requirements, many folks don’t really know what they need and just default to GPS/GNSS. When asked about performance requirements for future PNT systems, many program managers respond by asking about what is possible. This “what do you need?”/ “what can I have?” cycle can be frustrating for providers.

Adoption 

Adoption often requires integration and can be expensive. User equipment (MGUE) for M-Code was given as an example several times. Putting satellites in space is less expensive than the required networks and user equipment on the ground. Modular open system architectures (MOSA) will help with new builds, but legacy systems are a significant challenge.

Integration

Integration is difficult and expensive. Platforms are highly varied and it is expensive to develop and execute a program to integrate new signals and systems for each one. The sheer number of platforms that use GPS is huge. Again, MOSA will help a lot, but its biggest impact will be with new systems.

Dual Civil/Military 

America’s experience with implementation and adoption of GPS can provide a number of lessons for future systems. Among them is the benefit of dual use—military and civilian. That’s fostered through a virtuous cycle of broad research, lower size-weight-power-cost user equipment economic order quantities, and greater adoption.

PACE

Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) was cited several times as a systems engineering way to look at a layered PNT approach. GPS/GNSS will be primary for the foreseeable future. Emergency will likely always be paper maps, looking out the window, dead reckoning, and the like. This helps organizations focus on determining which systems should be used for Alternate and Contingency.

Quantum

Practical and affordable clocks and sensors are getting closer. Size, weight, power and cost still remain challenges. Engineering work to enable manufacture at scale is also needed. The technology has the potential to be widely commercialized in 10 years or so.

“America is so far behind!”

Most attendees found a presentation by Wing Commander Mark Brammer from the United Kingdom both inspiring and a bit discouraging (he was happy to have his remarks exempted from the Chatham House Rule). Brammer discussed the need to move away from over-dependence on space and how the UK established a cross-government office to coordinate national PNT efforts to ensure both military and civil PNT needs are met. 

He described Britain’s plan for a resilient national PNT architecture, which has been funded and is being executed. It involves a very robust fiber timing network with three timing centers, an eLoran network that will serve the British Isles and adjacent maritime approaches, and integration with space-based PNT sources. 

Governance

Numerous comments from panelists and attendees identified governance as the primary reason the U.S. is so far behind the U.K. in the journey to PNT resilience. 

Multiple mature technologies are available. Cost was not seen as a principal obstacle, and the phrase “for less than the cost of putting one MEO satellite in space …” was heard more than once. 

The group consensus was that America’s governance structure is so dispersed, we are handicapped in our ability to decide and act. One attendee commented “Everyone is responsible, so no one is responsible.”

This view has also been articulated by the President’s National Space-based PNT Advisory Board, though in that case U.S. PNT resilience was compared to that of China. APNT governance shortfall was also called out by attendees at September’s PNT Leadership Summit hosted by the RNT Foundation and Inside GNSS.

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Since 2004, the primary goal of America’s national PNT policy and governance structure has been to maintain United States leadership in space-based positioning, navigation and timing (PNT). While GPS remains an outstanding system, it has been surpassed in many ways by Europe’s Galileo and China’s BeiDou.

Perhaps more significantly, while China, Russia and other nations have or are building complementary and backup systems for space-based PNT, the U.S. has no deployed capability or plans for any. This, despite a presidential mandate for such a system that stood from 2004 to 2021, and senior leaders in the current administration citing the need.

When asked why the nation has fallen behind in both space-based and alternative PNT, many experts often give a one word answer: governance. 

Governance is often defined as the process by which leaders make decisions. In the U.S., the current process for PNT was established in 2004 by President George W. Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 4. It was later slightly updated in the waning days of the first Trump administration by Space Policy Directive 7 (SPD 7), issued January 15, 2021. 

America’s PNT governance structure is complicated. One in which responsibility is shared and authority is diffuse.

A Fragmented System 

Leadership of PNT issues is assigned to two departments: The Department of Defense/War (DOD/W) for military uses and users and The Department of Transportation (DOT) for civil users.

Each department has its own internal governance processes, its own priorities, and its own bureaucratic machinery. 

Inside DOT: Many Duties, Lots of Collaboration

The DOT lead for PNT is the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R). But PNT is only one of many responsibilities, which also include spectrum management and overseeing the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the Highly Automated Systems Safety Center of Excellence, the Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office, the Office of Research, Development & Technology, the Transportation Safety Institute, the Volpe National Transportation Center, and the Strengthening Mobility and Revolutionizing Transportation (SMART) grant program.

For PNT issues, OST-R coordinates 10 internal DOT organizations and a group of 10 organizations outside DOT. Together, these groups advise the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Transportation.

Inside DOD/W: A Heavyweight Process with Lots of Players

On the defense side, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) is the Secretary’s principal staff assistant for PNT. But again, PNT is only one of many duties—others include information technology, cybersecurity, spectrum policy, communications, command and control, and SATCOM.

The CIO follows an iterative process that feeds into the DoD PNT Oversight Council, a body of 19 senior leaders—service secretaries, combatant commanders, undersecretaries, and intelligence chiefs. Very senior, very busy people who lead large and important organizations.

All must work together to advise the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Defense.

When Issues Cross Departments: The EXCOM 

For national PNT issues that fall outside the authority of either DOT or DoD/W, governance shifts to the National Space Based PNT Executive Committee (EXCOM), co-led by the deputy secretaries of Transportation and Defense/War.

SPD-7 tasks the EXCOM to “…make recommendations on sustainment, modernization, and policy matters regarding United States space-based PNT services to its member agencies, and to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or the Executive Secretary of the National Space Council, as appropriate.”

Not visible in the formal process is the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Yet, OMB is arguably the most important and powerful component of the executive branch. The office drives budgets, oversees the President’s Management Agenda, and adjudicates cross-department issues and priorities. Without OMB support, department initiatives die on the vine.

The EXCOM meets once or twice a year and serves primarily as a coordinating body. Despite the many people involved, or perhaps because of it, the United States has:

• Lost its place as the leader in space-based PNT, and

• Failed to safeguard national and economic security with long called for alternative PNT capabilities

What About Leadership?

Bureaucracy is inherent in government. Strong leadership can often cut through it—especially in times of crisis—and overcome obstacles that stall progress.

Leadership, in fact, is an essential element of good governance. It is the energy that powers structures, processes and institutions. But governance structures matter as well. They can nurture and enable leadership, or they can constrain and frustrate it.

If no crisis demands action and authorities and responsibilities are unclear, initiatives become vulnerable to criticism or outright veto from those wary of change or protective of their organizational “lane.” 

Too many stakeholders can make collaboration unwieldy and give de facto veto power to individuals or groups who should not have it. And without a clear mandate from the top to achieve specific goals, even capable and determined leaders can find themselves blocked at every turn by an unwieldy governance structure and process. 

Time for a Reset 

Disruptions to GPS and other GNSS signals are increasing daily and are being seen more frequently in the homeland. Protecting the satellites, signals and their users is a national security and economic imperative. 

America has an abundance of technical expertise and commercially avail-able PNT products and services that can enable it to regain world leadership while guarding its national and economic security. 

It is time to reset our PNT governance and put these advantages to use. 

But this effort can’t be one of just “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.” We need a whole new ship. 

America’s new PNT policy and governance must:

• Be about more than space. The need for one or more widely available backup and complementary sources of PNT for GPS in America is widely accepted. In a January 2021 report, the DOT found that combining signals from space with terrestrial broadcast and timing over fiber would constitute a core national resilient PNT architecture. That could be a great starting point.

• Identify and empower a “trail boss” or “first among equals.” Someone responsible for ensuring policies and plans are executed, timelines are met, and those responsible for action are held to account. Not a “czar,” but a champion tasked with bringing key actors and stakeholders together, developing a national plan, then ensuring it is executed.

• Establish specific goals and requirements for national PNT resilience. An updated policy and governance document doesn’t necessarily need to state accuracy, integrity, availability, and continuity requirements. But it should describe a resilient end state and draw the line between what utility-level services America’s national PNT architecture will provide, and what higher demand users must source for themselves. The core national resilient PNT architecture must be a backbone that other PNT systems and providers can leverage and build upon.

• A timeline to achieve the goals. For over two decades, national PNT policy has listed a variety of general and specific goals. None have had associated timelines and few have been achieved. A minimal resilient national PNT architecture of space, terrestrial broadcast, and fiber—the “resilient triad”—could be easily and quickly implemented. Mature technologies exist and can be available as products or performance-based service contracts. A target of five years would not be unreasonable for terrestrial components.

• Include OMB as an essential player. While SPD-7, and perhaps other national policy documents, discuss recommendations being submitted to the president, as a practical matter, that rarely happens, if ever. Instead, recommendations go to his personal management and budget staff—OMB. Unless they are on board, nothing happens.

Today’s PNT policy was published in the last few days of the first Trump administration. Its governance structure and processes are nearly identical to those used by the previous two administrations. In the five years since SPD-7 was published, the risk to the nation from over-dependence on GPS has increased significantly. It is time for this administration to break from its predecessors, forge a new path, and make America safer.

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For many in the PNT community, the event evoked memories of a much longer, 44-hour disruption in that area in 2022.

For two minutes, between 11:47 and 11:49 local time on March 19, 12 aircraft reported false positions as a result of the interference. The incident was reported on the social media site LinkedIn. Both Benoit Figuet of SKAI Data Services, which operates the GPSwise advisory service, and Jeremy Bennington from Spirent, which offers the Watchman service, posted about the event.

Bennington was less specific about the time of the event but reported that it was to the west of DFW and had varying impacts on aircraft.

“Over the past 24 hours, we observed a GPS spoofing event to the west of DFW impacting multiple flights.” He cited eight flights from four airlines and commented that one had “brief low-integrity indications before and after,” another “lost GPS for the remainder of the flight,” and a third “experienced a loss of ADS-B without clear spoofing.”

“What stands out is the geographic consistency—almost all affected aircraft were on the west side of DFW, with only one instance on the east side,” he said.

“Even more interesting: Most aircraft maintained ‘good’ integrity indications. In more established interference zones, we often see integrity degradation before and after spoofing events. That wasn’t consistently the case here, which could make these events more difficult for flight crews to recognize and manage in real time.”

Bennington also discussed the impact to aviation safety.

“This is particularly concerning given the phase of flight. Interference during approach and departure introduces real safety risks, including the potential for false eGPWS alerts.”

Stanford University GPS experts Todd Walter, Zixi Liu and Sherman Lo observed that the “spoof to” location was near the center of effect, which had a greater than 50-mile radius. This “…also appears to be near Fort Wolters Range Control, a former Army base,” Walter said. He commented that Fort Wolters had been the site of DHS counter-UAS testing in the past. 

Mitch Narins, president of Strategic Synergies and a former Chief Systems Engineer for Navigation at the FAA, said no advisories for exercises or tests had been posted for the day the spoofing took place.

This has led some to speculate the incident was the result of an accidental or unannounced use of a system that interferes with GPS reception as a way to deter or disable drones.

Department of Transportation (DOT) officials have been upgrading their ability to respond to such events since the 2022 incident. In this case, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was immediately alerted by aviation users and the department quickly responded to ensure the problem source was identified and terminated.

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Storytelling is the most powerful communication tool we have. Stories can inform and inspire. Stories can also mislead.

The biggest challenges to advancing PNT policy in the U.S. are false and misleading stories around the need for resilient PNT. These myths have frozen the nation in place for decades while our adversaries and allies have made tremendous advances. Here are some of the most pernicious and why they need to be eliminated from our discussions.

1. “GPS/GNSS is enough.” 

Of all the PNT policy myths, at least this one seems to be on the way to being dispelled.

It was certainly solidly in place in 2009. That’s when the National Space-based PNT Executive Committee’s decision to transform Loran-C to eLoran to meet a presidential mandate for a backup was overturned.

Bureaucrats, lobbyists and budgeteers refused to accept that the tens of billions of dollars invested in GPS, admittedly the most important, empowering and beneficial technology in the previous 40 years, hadn’t solved America’s utility-level PNT needs forever.

Today, most officials across the federal government familiar with the problem, including those in Congress, seem to have admitted the problem. Now, the challenges seem to be a lack of clarity about who is responsible for ensuring America has the resilient PNT it needs and how to get there.

This has likely been exacerbated by the abundance of non-GNSS PNT technologies developed in the last two decades. For some, more options seem to have made decisions more difficult.

2. “We have to (or ‘they want to’) replace GPS.”

Only someone deliberately trying to confuse things or who is entirely unfamiliar with the issues would propose “replacing GPS.”

GPS is an amazing system that will be the centerpiece of America’s PNT architecture for decades. There are an estimated 10 to 15 billion user devices across the world, far more than one for every person on the planet. GPS signals are an essential component of innumerable systems and applications. Not maintaining GPS for the foreseeable future is almost unimaginable, and certainly not practical.

Our efforts must be to complement and backup GPS/GNSS with other PNT. One or more widely adopted alternative sources will make GPS and other GNSS safer and more reliable in two ways.

First, it will “get the bullseye off GPS” by making satellites and signals much less desirable targets. If users are not impacted by interference, or impacts are greatly lessened, bad actors will have little reason to interfere. Over time, jamming and spoofing equipment will become less popular, less available and more expensive. A virtuous cycle will begin to nearly eliminate deliberate interference.

Second, users and their applications will be protected in the event of any interference with GPS/GNSS, malicious or not.

Ongoing non-malicious threats to GPS/GNSS also pose significant risk for users. 

Accidental interference, while often low level and benign, is commonplace. Europe’s STRIKE3 project detected more than 450,000 signals that could interfere with GNSS reception. Only about 10% were judged to be deliberate.

And while the probabilities of events like severe solar activity and Kessler syndrome debris damage are low, those probabilities are greater than zero.

Our efforts must be to complement and backup GPS/GNSS, not replace it.

3. “More study is needed.”

During World War II, America’s Office of Strategic Services published its “Simple Sabotage Manual” for agents embedded in adversary governments. It advised “Whenever possible refer all matters to committees for further study and consideration.”

While having more information is almost always good, looking for more when you already have enough is a classic way to avoid making decisions and taking action.

America’s growing over-dependence on GPS was formally recognized in a 1998 Presidential Decision Directive by President Bill Clinton. This resulted in the Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center producing a report in 2001 that validated a variety of concerns. It also predicted jamming and spoofing would be growing problems and recommended maintenance of terrestrial PNT capabilities.

Unfortunately, the report published only a few days before 9/11. So, it wasn’t until 2004 that President George W. Bush issued a mandate for a GPS backup. This, of course, generated another study. 

But rather than be guided by the results of that study and others and fulfilling the mandate, subsequent administrations have continued to admire the problem.

There have been more than enough studies of GPS’s vulnerabilities and technologies that can provide complementary and backup services. Major efforts have included DOT’s 2001 Volpe report, a paper by the Institute for Defense Analysis in 2009, an extensive DOD/DHS/DOT analysis in 2014 (never made public), and another report by DOT in 2021.

And yet government PNT studies and analyses continue.

Again, continually increasing our store of knowledge is good, if that is what’s happening. But merely understanding the problem better will not solve it.

Two and a half decades of studies with similar findings are enough to inform action. 

Leadership’s next steps must be establishing performance requirements for America’s resilient core PNT architecture and empowering an executive agent to ensure that architecture is put in place.

4. “It’s all about infrastructure protection.”

“Infrastructure protection” has been a buzz phrase for decades. Infrastructure is important and we must protect it with resilient PNT. That won’t do the whole job, however, because what we really want is a secure and prosperous nation.

National security means domestic resilient PNT to underpin non-
infrastructure applications like Golden Dome, UAS operations, Counter-UAS operations, the many applications used by the defense industrial base, first responders, and the list goes on. 

Likewise, there are far more contributors to the nation’s economy and prosperity beyond just infrastructure. Everything from the corner coffee shop and Uber drivers to complex factory SCADA systems need PNT.

Every American contributes to the economy in some way, and everyone needs PNT. If their PNT is not resilient, the economy and our prosperity are on a knife’s edge. 

Protecting infrastructure is necessary, but not sufficient.

5. “We just need to educate users.”

In 1964, the Surgeon General formally warned Americans about the dangers of smoking. At that time, 42% of Americans were smokers. In 1972, after eight years of warnings and education, 43% of Americans were smokers.

There is a big gap between knowing something and acting on that knowledge.

President Bush formally identified America’s lack of PNT resilience as a problem in December 2004 (and mandated a solution). President Trump issued Executive Order 13905 in February 2020 warning GPS users to get their own backup systems. Yet, in 2026 the nation’s PNT does not seem to be much more resilient.

Changing Americans’ PNT habits will require effort and expense, but most importantly leadership. Members of the National Space-based PNT Advisory Board, attendees of the September 2025 PNT Leadership Summit, and others have all concluded that leadership is the missing piece to addressing resilient PNT in the U.S.

6. “The government needs to build a GPS backup system.”

Nope. The government should not build anything. It should lead and, leveraging competition and America’s commercial sector to its best advantage, ensure something is built.

The government’s responsibility is to ensure Americans have easy access to a backup system and that it is widely adopted. There are several ways to do that including regulation, legislation, allowing public use of a system built to support government missions (ala GPS), and sponsoring a system in part or in whole.

If the latter method is selected, the process must include fair and open competition. 

There are numerous mature and commercially available PNT systems that can be had as services. Once the government establishes performance requirements, it will be a relatively simple matter to let a multi-year service contract. Competition against clear requirements will eliminate the need for endless studies and provide the best value for the public dollar. 

A long, expensive, and painful government major system acquisition must be avoided at all costs.

7. “The market will provide the GPS backup America needs. Government doesn’t need to do anything.”

This is probably the most insidious of all the myths because it speaks to traditional American values of limited government and market economics. Yet, it shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of GPS and PNT.

Some misunderstanding might be due to the existing and thriving market in specialized PNT services for high demand users. When there is a business case, commercial users do regularly pay for resilient PNT. Farmers subscribe for precision agriculture. Day traders pay for resilient nano and picoseconds. Shipping terminals contract for systems that place containers within millimeters.

But GPS, while it began as a military weapons system, quickly became a public utility. One that is integrated with and benefits every aspect of the economy. Government-provided utilities are not easily subject to market forces.

Where is the business case? Why would a potential PNT provider build a national system and try to get consumers to purchase what the government is already giving them for free? 

And what would be the national benefit?

Even if such a company was to somehow survive, would enough Americans subscribe to really protect the economy from a long-term GPS outage? Would having a system that only a fraction of Americans accessed be enough to deter our adversaries from interfering or threatening to interfere with GPS and gain advantage over America?

The United States government has provided utility-level navigation since the formation of the Lighthouse Service in 1789. It has provided timing since the Naval Observatory began dropping a noon time-ball in 1845. Leaders understood that PNT is a fundamental economic driver. That’s why the Department of Commerce’s shield still features a lighthouse and why the department hosts the nation’s civil time scale at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

GPS is merely the most recent way the government has provided America with utility-level PNT, and it has been spectacularly successful at boosting the economy.

Claiming the government has no role or responsibility for providing a utility-level backup capability for GPS might be an honest misunderstanding.

It might also be a way some commercial interests are trying to advance their own fortunes. 

It might be how some government officials are trying to shirk what they see as difficult responsibilities.

Regardless, such claims are false and misleading. They continue to harm the nation and increase the risk to America’s security and prosperity.

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GNSS Interference as a Trigger

Specifically mentioned is Russia’s regular disruption of GNSS signals in the region and its negative impacts on maritime safety. The letter was posted on government sites the same day as the release of a major report by the United Kingdom’s Royal Institute of Navigation about the adverse effects of GNSS interference on maritime operations.

The declaration seems to indicate a seismic shift in how these nations regard and enforce international maritime codes. Heretofore vessels in “innocent passage” were rarely interfered with, even if there were suspected violations. 

The letter and its enforcement also may be a way to finally bring a halt to Russia’s unabashed jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS signals in the region.

The letter opens by citing maritime’s dependence on GNSS, the hazards of it being disrupted, and places the blame for recent disruptions squarely with the Russian Federation. 

It then calls on all nations and maritime operators to recognize that interference with GNSS and shipboard AIS systems is a safety and security threat, and to train mariners to operate safely when GNSS is not available.

It also calls for the international community and nations to “Cooperate on the development of alternative terrestrial radionavigation systems which may be used in place of GNSS in the event of disruption, loss of signal or interference.” 

Alternative Terrestrial Radionavigation and MaRINav

The Maritime Resilience and Integrity of Navigation (MaRINav) project was sponsored by the European Space Agency and examined several terrestrial and space-based systems. The project’s report published in 2020. Since then, several nations in northern Europe have begun or completed projects to improve one or more aspects of positioning, navigation, and timing. These include terrestrial-based timing systems in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK), and the UK and France agreeing to establish an eLoran network. 

A Manifesto for Stricter Enforcement

The open letter seems to be very much a manifesto and is addressed to all organizations and individuals involved in maritime operations from the U.N.’s International Maritime Organization, to nation-states, shipping companies, and individual seafarers.

After its discussion of protecting GNSS and AIS, the letter goes on to say that all international maritime law and norms must be more strictly adhered to.

“Furthermore…the full and consistent implementation of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations is fundamental to ensuring maritime safety, the smooth functioning of shipping, and the protection of seafarers and the marine environment…”

The increasing use of “shadow fleets” to avoid international sanctions is specifically mentioned. 

The signatories say they “require” compliance and use “shall“ and “must” when referring to adherence to specific provisions. 

“[We] require that all vessels exercising freedom of navigation strictly comply with applicable international law, whether customary international law or as contracting parties to international conventions…”

Such language seems to indicate a willingness, perhaps even an eagerness to take enforcement action against offenders.

Stateless Vessels and Shadow Fleets

Ten frequently violated provisions of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention and other international maritime agreements are mentioned as concerns. They include precautions to avoid collisions, to ensure vessels have proper documentation, and to prevent pollution.

The first to be mentioned is the requirement that a ship fly the flag of only one nation-state. Ships that fly the flags of two or more states are deemed stateless. A vessel is also deemed stateless if it is flying a nation’s flag, but that nation does not acknowledge it is one of theirs. Any nation can take law enforcement action against stateless vessels much like they would against pirates.

Where Enforcement Might Bite

How and where the signatories will act against violators is not mentioned in the letter. This is the real “meat” of the issue and will determine how much of a sea change this will be. Presumably, they will focus on shadow fleet vessels that can be treated as stateless. 

Conceivably they could act against at least some violations anywhere on the globe outside of the territorial waters of another nation. 

It is most likely that, at least initially, enforcement will be focused on the Baltic and North Sea. Both of these areas, with the exception of a small portion of the Gulf of Finland near St. Petersburg, Russia, lie within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of one of the letter’s signatories. Under the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states have the ability to enforce regulations to protect their waters in these zones. An EEZ typically extends 200 nautical miles seaward, or until it meets the EEZ of another nation. 

Leverage Over Russian Trade Routes

In addition to making maritime generally safer, the declaration and its follow-on actions could be an effective way to greatly curtail or halt Russian interference with GNSS in the region. 

All traffic to Russian ports in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg must make lengthy transits through the North Sea and Baltic. This commerce, especially through St. Petersburg, is critical as it serves a large segment of Russia’s industry and population. Any slowing or reduction could have significant economic consequences. 

The letter was signed by “The Coastal States of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea with Iceland: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.”

The open letter is available on numerous government websites such as the German Federal Ministry of Transport.

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One sign of NAB’s emphasis on BPS, NAB President and CEO Curtis LeGeyt said, is the recent appointment of Sam Matheny and Tariq Mondal as executive vice president and vice president, Broadcast Positioning System, respectively. Matheny, former NAB CTO, and Mondal, former NAB vice president for advanced technology, were key to the development of BPS.

These moves come about a year after BPS stability was declared “comparable to or better than GNSS” for time transfer and a “viable complementary PNT solution” by scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in a peer reviewed paper presented at the Institute of Navigation (ION) International Technical Meeting. In August 2025, NAB was awarded a contract from the Department of Transportation (DOT) for a field trial of BPS with critical infrastructure partner Dominion Energy.  

Wanting “speed and efficacy,” LeGeyt said Matheny and Mondal’s new, more focused roles will accelerate continued development of BPS and use cases adding to the many ways broadcasters bring value to the nation with their allocated spectrum. 

BPS and NextGen TV

BPS signals can be transmitted as part of television broadcasts from stations that have transitioned to the NextGen TV standard, ATSC 3.0. 

While almost 80% of Americans are already served by at least one station broadcasting the new standard, the industry is urging a uniform and comprehensive technology transition. BPS is just one of the new services that can be enabled by such a transition. 

“BPS will certainly benefit the public,” LeGeyt said. “It also demonstrates that ATSC 3.0 enables data services embedded with TV broadcasts that go well beyond traditional linear video and audio.”  

In early 2025, NAB petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to facilitate a complete transition to ATSC 3.0. NAB proposed stations in the top 55 U.S. markets could transition to the new standard by 2028, and the remainder by 2030. After receiving numerous comments, on October 28, 2025, the FCC voted unanimously to approve a Notice of Proposed Rule Making. The Notice seeks comment on a variety of issues, including transition dates and schedules. Initial comments were due on January 20, with reply comments due on February 18.

System of Systems

It will take more than one solution to backup GPS, and LeGeyt said “NAB and BPS want to be part of that system of systems approach.” 

“BPS is a great innovation that leverages existing spectrum and physical infrastructure,” LeGeyt said. “But it is not a silver bullet. Providing a utility-level national complement and backup for GPS will require at least a couple of systems. Depending on the application, some users will still want to supplement what is provided nationwide, just as they do now with GPS.” 

Public Service, Collaboration, Leadership

Broadcasters use public airways and have long been custodians of public trust, LeGeyt said. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) and serving as first informers in times of crisis are examples of the public services they provide. NAB envisions timing and PNT from BPS as another public service that will continue their legacy of service to the nation. 

Moving forward, LeGeyt also sees opportunities for NAB to coordinate and lead on PNT resilience more generally. “As an industry nonprofit, NAB regularly works with other trade associations, Congress, the executive branch and industries to balance competing interests.” 

He believes this positions NAB well to support the government implementing a minimal resilient national PNT architecture. “We would be happy to bring our experience and expertise to bear in some capacity,” LeGeyt added.

Yet, implementing any kind of scheme to complement and backup GPS won’t be effortless or cost free. 

“While establishing BPS nationwide and other terrestrial systems could be relatively inexpensive, it won’t be free,” LeGeyt said. “We are eager to help the government get the bullseye off GPS and make the nation safer. We are looking forward to the administration’s leadership on this issue.” 

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Today, the department may well be in the process of developing one or more resilient PNT systems to support defensive capabilities that will also benefit civil users.

Metro Golden Domes

In a recent paper [1],  the National Security Space Association (NSSA) outlined how resilient PNT is essential to the success of the President’s Golden Dome initiative. 

In the popular imagination, Golden Dome is a virtual shield of systems protecting the U.S. from intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic drones and the like. Much less well known is the project’s “inner, limited area, layer” to protect against UAS launched from American soil or just beyond our borders. 

The NSSA paper describes this part of the project as “Metro Golden Domes.” They will be, according to many experts, much easier and less expensive to create than the system being designed to protect the whole county. Technologies to support these smaller scale systems are already commercially available, many from multiple vendors. While some integration of components may be required, protecting military bases and cities from drone attacks will not require the kinds of technological advances needed to “hit a bullet with a bullet” and reliably destroy incoming hypersonic missiles.

A Single Point of Failure

One challenge that must be overcome for all the nation’s Golden Dome efforts to succeed, according to the NSSA paper, is America’s over-reliance on GPS. 

The paper highlights three specific areas where more resilient, less deniable and less spoofable, PNT is required for Golden Dome success:

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Sensor Platforms. As outlined in the paper, “Detecting and tracking adversarial systems in-flight can be challenging, and PNT solutions are critical to determining the ‘where’ and ‘when’ vital in ensuring effective intercept information in all phases of potential adversarial attacks.”

Precision-Guided Interceptors. Whether it is a 100 foot-long Russian ICBM, or a 2 foot-wide drone with 10 pounds of explosive, defensive systems must strike difficult-to-hit targets. Precise timing is also essential to synchronizing various intercept system components.

Command and Control Systems. Communication systems rely on precise timing for multiplex operations. IT systems need timing for synchronization and data tagging. PNT is essential for common operational pictures and other situational awareness tools.

NSSA’s paper concludes with several recommendations for General Michael Guetlein, Space Force’s leader of Golden Dome. They include clearly articulating requirements, establishing an organization and leader for Golden Dome PNT, developing user equipment early, and establishing a “PNT improvement budget” with the goal of “deploying improvements within the next three years.”

The paper’s conclusion also pleads for a focus on integration, highlighting the interconnectedness of all components and their reliance on PNT as an invisible tech utility: 

“Integration across systems that Golden Dome is dependent upon, systems that protect Golden Dome, and Golden Dome specific systems are essential to avoid electronic fratricide, system interference, and degraded system performance. Each of these systems is dependent upon common PNT frequencies, signals and enablers that Golden Dome will also seek to defeat in an adversary system. The adversary will also be employing counter-PNT systems, and those adversary systems must be thwarted.”

A National Core Resilient PNT Architecture

GPS and one or two easily adoptable complementary and backup PNT systems could constitute a national core resilient PNT architecture. Senior administration officials and policy documents have periodically called for systems to complement and back up GPS for the last two decades. In 2018, Congress enacted legislation requiring the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to help back up GPS.  

Yet, highly diffused responsibility for civil PNT within the administration and the absence of a broad public demand for solutions has meant little progress. At the same time, America’s principal adversary, China, has established a highly effective and resilient PNT architecture that includes multiple satellite constellations, terrestrial broadcast, and hundreds of synchronized timing stations connected by 20,000 kilometers of fiber. 

Golden Dome may provide the opportunity to overcome America’s bureaucratic challenge with PNT. The DoD is not responsible, nor does it budget for, systems to benefit and protect domestic infrastructure and applications. Yet a defense capability, like GPS, can also support civil users. 

Highly resilient PNT is a key enabler for Golden Dome and for making a host of civil applications—autonomy, transportation, IT, telecom, and the like—more reliable and scalable. As Golden Dome solves its resilient PNT needs, it should also benefit civil users, making America even more efficient, safe and secure. 

References 

1. “Resilient PNT is Vital to Golden Dome Success” https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/20/gps-interference-crashed-a-survey-drone-in-the-uk-will-the-debate-resonate-in-the-us/

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GPSPatron and Gdynia Maritime University (GMU) established a partnership in 2024 to examine GNSS interference at ground level. Krasimir Hristov, GPSPatron’s head of business development and partnerships, said the two organizations share research interests in maritime navigation security, GNSS vulnerability, and advanced interference-detection technologies—especially as they impact maritime.

Their first project involved GPSPatron mounting a GNSS interference detector about 15 meters above sea level on GMU’s Faculty of Navigation building facing the Gulf of Gdansk. After monitoring the area for nine months they published their results in early 2025. Findings include:

-More than 84 hours of interference, most of which was jamming.

-Some interference events were more than 7 hours long.

-There was no correlation between events detected on the ground and those detected by aviation ADS-B. 

-Strong indications that some sources of interference were mobile.

Building on this work, the team took to the high seas with their interference detection equipment from June to October. Their new report, “GNSS Interference Monitoring in the Baltic Sea: Shipborne Observations near the Kaliningrad Enclave Marine Border,” reveals some interesting changes in interference activity over the previous year and impacts on maritime traffic.

Jamming to Spoofing

In the 2024 study, the team only detected jamming. This year, every event was a combination of multi-constellation jamming and spoofing. False GPS L1 signals were transmitted while other GNSS signals were jammed.

More Disruptions

Interference was active a higher percentage of the time this year compared to the previous study, and persistent events were longer. In one 48 hour window, interference was active for 30 hours.

Coordinated Interference, Four Types and Locations

The study found four types of transmitters operating in four different locations that all activated and ceased at the same time, indicating a centralized tactical coordination. The sources were:

-GPS spoofing transmitter generating forged GPS L1 signals.

-Lower-band chirp jammer targeting GPS, Galileo and BeiDou.

-Upper-band chirp jammer targeting GLONASS exclusively.

-Full-band analog-like jammer flooding the entire 60 MHz GNSS L1 band.

Stronger Offshore than Dockside

When the vessel was offshore, the interference detected was as much as 15dB stronger than when it was moored dockside. As the ship approached the waters off Kaliningrad, the interference signal strength steadily increased to its highest level. 

Interference within Port of Gdańsk

While shore infrastructure seemed to often be shielded from interference by terrain and other obstacles, the project detected repeated instances of jamming coming from within the port itself. Jammers in passenger vehicles were a repeat problem as RF noise. 

“Industrial RF noise, appearing in multi-hour intervals on 3, 5 and 10 September, produced broadband emissions consistent with malfunctioning electrical or RF equipment,” according to the report.

While not part of the study, Hristov said other impacts to shore infrastructure have been observed. 

“We’ve seen multiple cases where operations were slowed, paused or temporarily shut down due to degraded positioning reliability. For example, offshore wind construction activities have been halted on several occasions when GNSS accuracy dropped below operational thresholds, and there have been instances where container ports were forced to idle equipment until signals stabilized. These disruptions tend to be shorter and more contained compared to offshore incidents, but the operational and financial consequences are for sure significant.” 

In many of these cases, the impacted parties have reasons to not formally report or publicize the disruptions. 

As is the case with most studies of interference in aviation, the authors of this report urge mariners to exercise caution over being alarmed. Numerous maritime systems, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS, which is analogous to aviation’s ADS-B) are degraded or made inoperable by interference with GPS and other GNSS. 

Continued Joint Efforts

The PNT and maritime community can expect to see further joint work from the two organizations. 

“Our collaboration includes knowledge exchange, joint exploration of real-world GNSS disruption scenarios, and discussions on potential research initiatives that connect academic expertise with GPSPatron’s field-tested technology,” Hristov said. “Marine University of Gdynia values the opportunity to integrate practical commercial insights into its curriculum and research programs, while GPSPatron benefits from the university’s academic depth, testing environments, and access to domain specialists.”

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In many situations, the biggest threat is not the biggest risk. Failure to understand that and focusing on what appears to be the most pressing concern can lead to disaster.

A classic example is flood preparedness in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina. 

The biggest flood threat to the city has always been frequent intense rains from tropical and other storms. These often overwhelm the city’s stormwater management system. Streets and low-lying areas typically flood for a few hours, though sometimes it takes a day or more for the system’s pumps and drains to catch up. This happens so frequently it has become a fact of life. Residents have adapted by avoiding low areas and protecting their property as much as possible.

Yet, New Orleans’ biggest flood risk has always been a Category 5 Hurricane overtopping and destroying levees. While these storms only strike once every hundred years, their impact is devastating. 

Before Katrina, New Orleans had guarded against its greatest flood threat, but not its greatest risk. When Katrina struck, that error cost 3,000 lives and $125 billion in property damage.

PNT Threats and Risks 

Localized GPS jamming and spoofing is the biggest threat to PNT services in America and Europe. Local and regional jamming and spoofing has become a fact of life and users are adapting by altering their behavior and, in some cases, upgrading equipment. 

The biggest risk to PNT services is by most reckonings some form of long-term GNSS denial. Not the widespread, relatively low impact interference seen today. Yet, it’s been a challenge for Western governments to act to avoid a Katrina-like PNT disaster spread across multiple continents, a disaster it will take decades or more to recover from. 

Risk Assessment

Structured risk assessments are one way to help leaders and their support staff focus on these kinds of issues.

At a high level, most methodologies assess risk from a potential adverse event as the product of threat: the probability of the adverse event; vulnerability, or the degree the impacted system or population is likely to suffer damage; and consequence, which is the amount of damage likely to occur if no mitigations are in place. Expressed as an equation:

The risk equation for potential malicious acts is slightly more complex. Threat is defined as the probability a bad actor can commit the act (capability) multiplied by the probability the bad actor will actually carry out the act (intent). This makes the risk equation for malicious acts:

Risk Assessment Challenges

Barriers to risk assessment include: 

Estimating consequences. A significant obstacle to analyzing larger potential events is the difficulty of predicting consequences. For example, the pre-Katrina estimate of potential storm damage was less than 10% of what actually occurred.

Widespread, long-term GNSS denial is a much larger potential event and estimating consequence is much more problematic. 

A good example of this is a 2019 study sponsored by the U.S. government examining the economic impact of losing GPS. It found an outage would cost the national economy $1 billion per day. While, at first glance, that seems a large number, it represented less than a 1.7% reduction in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a very low consequence for a technological utility described by a member of the U.S. National Security Council as “a single point of failure” for the nation. By comparison (though admittedly not entirely analogous), a 2021 power outage in Texas cost $28 billion a day and 57 lives over a week. 

It may not be possible to accurately predict and quantify the damage major societal disruptions cause. Multiple types of impacts, the interconnectedness of infrastructures, and the variety of human responses are highly complex and may be unknowable. 

Non-quantifiable consequences. The biggest challenge, perhaps, is many impactful consequences can’t be quantified. What cost can be assigned to a government collapsing, to a nation being coerced, or the loss of prestige and influence with other nations?

These challenges might make risk assessment seem not worth it, but it is. The more impactful the potential outcomes, the more important it is for leaders to take a deliberate, thoughtful approach. 

PNT Risk: Long Term GNSS Denial

The risk of long term GNSS denial is such a case. While good quantitative data may not be available or very difficult to obtain, there are things we know about the different elements of this risk equation. These help tell an impactful story and should inform decision-making.

Threat: Various possible adverse events can result in GNSS not being available to Western nations for extended periods or indefinitely. They include: 

Severe Solar Activity: Researchers predict powerful solar events that can disrupt signals for days or destroy satellites occur once every 200 to 300 years. While these events are very low probability, the probability is greater than zero. 

Electronic Warfare/ Cyber: The West’s adversaries have impressive terrestrial electronic warfare and cyber capabilities and are demonstrating them every day. These capabilities are also being moved into spaces where they are even more impactful. The non-zero probability of long-term GNSS denial to the West as the result of heightened world tensions, an autocrat’s whim, or open conflict amongst world powers must be considered.

Kinetic+: Several nations have or are developing capabilities to damage or destroy GNSS satellites. Press reports about Russian space-based nuclear weapons, Chinese satellite proximity operations, directed energy weapons, and the like show these must be considered in the overall risk.

Western Weakness: In November 2021, while preparing to invade Ukraine, Russia destroyed one if its defunct satellites with a ground-based missile. The next day, state media claimed that if NATO crossed Russia’s “red line,” Moscow would shoot down all 32 GPS satellites and blind the alliance. This may or may not have influenced U.S. policy and subsequent actions. Shortly after Russia’s public statement, though, the U.S. administration announced it would not send certain types of aid to Ukraine to “avoid provoking a Russian invasion.” A continued lack of PNT resilience in the West opens the door to further attempts at coercion. 

Vulnerability: Most Western nations have no systemic PNT alternatives and are vulnerable to the loss of GNSS. While some alternate timing and location capabilities are in place for some applications, widely available, easily adoptable alternatives are not. If access to GNSS was denied long term, the probability of significant damage is very high.

Consequence: The impact of long-term GNSS denial on Western nations would be severe. GNSS signals have been incorporated into virtually every infrastructure and most IT applications. Dependencies and linkages are so numerous, complex and intricate, a complete quantitative assessment of impacts is likely unattainable.

Qualitative consequences would almost certainly include severe economic disruption, civil unrest, and greatly reduced ability to field and support military operations—all contributing to domestic instability and enabling adversaries to dictate terms and otherwise influence events on the global stage.

What’s it Worth?

The threat of long-term GNSS denial to the West is greater than zero. Deciding how much greater is a matter of subjective judgement that will vary from person to person depending on their knowledge, background and biases. Yet, all must agree the probability must be considered.

Vulnerability is also a subjective and difficult judgement. How do we estimate the degree infrastructure, individual users, security forces and economies, are already protected? Is the West 90% vulnerable? Perhaps 80%? It is another unknowable number, but thinking about it and testing some hypotheses is important.

Consequence may be the most difficult element of the equation. What are the monetary and non-monetary costs of major societal disruptions? Are there meaningful ways to express them?

Perhaps a better way to look at the public policy question is to ask “what’s it worth?” How much are we willing to spend to reduce this risk? How should we spend it to get the maximum reduction? 

Some companies say they can provide a national terrestrial PNT system to complement and backup GPS for less than $90 million a year. Presumably, the government could then better encourage and, perhaps in some cases, mandate greater resilience. What would the risk reduction be? Is it worth the cost?

Mitigation: No silver bullet

It is never possible to eliminate risk, but there are ways to reduce it. Users can purchase better equipment and access alternative sources of time and location when able. Companies can better understand the criticality of PNT, their use of GNSS, and try to improve resilience. 

At the national level, we all must help leaders understand PNT is essential. Over-relying on GNSS poses unacceptable risk, setting the stage for disaster. 

A former boss of mine once said, “Good public policy is hard work…but only if you do it.” We need to get busy and do it.

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The ROK’s Loran-C system was installed by U.S. Forces in 1979. The ROK took over the Loran-C system from U.S. Forces in 1989 and has continually maintained the transmitters, recently upgrading them to the eLoran system. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for eLoran was achieved in 2023.

The U.K. and France cooperated with other nations in a Loran-C network until the end of 2015. The system was dis-established in deference to the developing Galileo GNSS, which would become operational at the end of 2016. While other nations decommissioned their stations, the U.K. maintained its single transmitter for use as a timing source. The U.K. is in the process of establishing its own sovereign eLoran network of six transmitters and has allocated a first funding tranche of $93 million. French President Emmanuel Macron announced In July that his nation would join with the U.K. in providing eLoran.

As the first nation allied with the West to establish an eLoran network, the ROK has taken the initiative to begin international discussions to ensure sovereign eLoran systems are standardized to support global transportation and trade. We reached out to the ROK’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, the department responsible for the nation’s eLoran system, to learn more about the country’s motivations and plans.

Q: The ROK has operated Loran for decades. What was the motivation behind the recent upgrade from Loran-C to eLoran?

A: Since 2010, ROK has intermittently experienced GPS jamming in the West Sea. In such cases, vessels become unable to receive GPS position information through their navigation equipment. Therefore, to provide resilient and robust positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services even under GPS jamming conditions, we developed the eLoran system and built the necessary infrastructure. A pilot service is currently being conducted in the West Sea.

Q: Is the eLoran standards meeting with the U.K. and France the first of its kind?

A: Yes. We held the meeting to share each country’s policy direction and technology development status related to eLoran, and to discuss future mutual development plans.

Q: Do the ROK, U.K. and France have a shared vision for the future of eLoran?

A: In order to respond to GPS jamming incidents occurring worldwide, we shared information on eLoran technologies and policies, and discussed potential future cooperation. Through this process, we believe a consensus was built on the importance of mutual collaboration.

Q: The ROK is on the opposite side of the globe from the U.K. and France and the countries’ eLoran systems won’t interact. Why is it important to establish shared standards?

A: Due to the recent increase in radio jamming incidents, IMO, ICAO and ITU issued a joint statement in March recommending measures to strengthen resilient and robust PNT systems for the safety of vessels, aircraft and timing systems.

With the goal of advancing eLoran as a resilient and robust alternative navigation system, we discussed technical standards such as signal specifications, data formats and receiver performance.

Even if the three countries’ systems are not directly interconnected at the moment, we believe that if more countries adopt eLoran standards in the future, gradual interconnection across regions such as Europe and Asia will become possible.

Q: Will the three countries be building on the existing eLoran standards set by SAE, or proposing something new?

A: We are reviewing areas where existing technical standards developed by international organizations—such as SAE, IMO, IALA, RTCM and ITU—may need to be supplemented or expanded. Through this process, we plan to continue discussions on standardization to promote the activation of eLoran services and to facilitate a smooth user environment.

Q: Does the Far East Radio Navigation Service organization still exist and meet? Will there be eLoran standards meetings that include China and Russia?

A: ROK, China and Russia operate the Far East Radio Navigation Service [FERNS] to promote cooperation and the development of maritime safety and radio navigation aids, and this cooperation continues.

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